Post-Event Information Affects Children’s Autobiographical Memory After One Year

In two experiments, we examined whether post-event information (PEI) about true and false events persisted in children’s reports after approximately 1 year. In Experiment 1, 4- to 6-year-olds were given PEI and then were given memory tests 2 weeks and 15 months later. Although PEI appeared in free recall at the initial testing, it decreased substantially by the long-term test. In contrast, on recognition tasks the children showed facilitation and misinformation effects at initial and follow-up tests. Experiment 2 replicated lasting misinformation and facilitation effects in recognition memory among 4- to 9-year-olds who were tested after 1-week and 10-month delays. We conclude that true and false reminders about an experienced event continue to affect children’s memory approximately 1 year later.

Situating soldiers’ demands: mutinies and protests in Burkina Faso

In Burkina Faso in 2011 military mutinies followed widespread civilian protests, indicating a crisis of confidence in President Compaoré. Through an in-depth examination of the events, this article encourages an understanding of military revolts that extends beyond the military. Although the mutineers never united with the demonstrators, their grievances mirrored those of the civilians. The article puts the revolts into a historic context and shows a pattern of interconnectedness between military revolts and civilian demonstrations in Burkina Faso. The work draws on interviews conducted with military personnel and civilians involved in the widespread protests.     

A distributive N-amendment game with endogenous agenda formation

In this paper I analyze a 3-person voting game in which players sequentially choose amendments to a bill and then vote sophisticatedly on the resulting agenda. This game differs from previous work on endogenous agenda formation in that the number of items on the agenda is not fixed. Players keep making proposals until they can do no better. I find that there is a nonempty set of minimax equilibrium outcomes to the game, and that this set contains the simple von Neumann–Morgenstern stable set.