Federal‐provincial overlap and civil servants: The case of occupational training in Quebec and Ontario

Abstract: Over the years, many analysts concerned with how federations work have presented the reduction of federal‐provincial overlap and duplication as a way of decreasing intergovernmental tensions. While some have presented such overlap and duplication as inevitable or even beneficial, few have tried to establish how overlap really works and whether it is a real problem or one created mostly by the provincial governments who wish to take issue with problems of federal funding, joint management and accountability. Despite the fact that, ultimately, public officials are in the best position to determine whether federal‐provincial overlap is causing inefficiencies, even fewer studies have focused on how they manage their relationship in areas where two orders of government are involved. Thus, the best possible source of information on how overlapping sectors are managed has been left out. This article examines how federal and provincial officials in Quebec and Ontario have managed their relationships in a particularly contentious sector: occupational training. Sommaire: Plusieurs auteurs intéressés au fonctionnement des fédérations ont, au fil des années, eu tendance à présenter la réduction des empiètements et recoupements fédéraux‐provinciaux comme une façon de décroître les tensions intergouvememen‐tales. Certains auteurs ont présenté de tels chevauchements et dédoublements comme inévitables, voire bénéfiques, mais peu d'entre eux se sont penchés sur le véritable fonctionnement de ces empiètements et s'ils sont un problème réel ou principalement créé par les gouvernements provinciaux désireux d'engager une contro‐verse sur des questions de financement, de gestion commune et d'imputabilité. Bien que les fonctionnaires soient, ultimement, les mieux placés pour évaluer si les recoupements fédéraux‐provinciaux constituent des sources d'inéfficience, peu d'écrits font état de la façon dont les fonctionnaires gèrent leurs relations lorsque les deux ordres de gouvernement sont impliqués. Ainsi, la meilleure source d'information sur la gestion de ce type de recoupements nous manque. Dans cet article, nous examinons comment des fonctionnaires fédéraux et provinciaux au Québec et c'n Ontario ont géré leurs relations dans un domaine particulièrement conflictuel: la formation de la main‐d'æeuvre.     

基于SNA视角的政府投资项目合谋关系研究

政府投资项目中腐败案件和工程事故的背后往往存在着合谋问题,合谋主体之间通过社会关系网结成合谋网络。本文从社会网络视角研究合谋关系结构特征,以上海"11.15"大火为例通过SNA分析政府投资项目中各利益主体之间的合谋关系及其利益关系。研究表明合谋关系网与利益关系网之间存在不一致性,合谋关系网中建设单位与总承包单位居于核心位置,合谋网络呈现多个中心性质。在结构洞位置,关键中间人通过收取建桥费获得高额合谋收益,而其他结构洞位置行为人通过收取过桥费获得合谋收益。合谋网络的核心结构行为人具有跨项目合谋特性,而其他行为人合谋具有单个项目性质。本文实现了微观具体主体行为与宏观关系网络相结合,拓展了社会网络分析方法在合谋领域的应用,丰富了对合谋关系的认识,强调在治理合谋问题时在关注合谋利益的同时,应关注关系网络。     

公共政策与社会政策：一个系统论的比较

公共政策与社会政策是多学科的交叉研究领域,二者行动主体和作用客体是存在差异的。公共政策的主体更多的是社会权威机构,以政府和利益集团为核心进行政策制定和决策分析;社会政策的主体是以政府为先导,更加依靠非政府的民间组织发挥政策制定和实施的功能。公共政策偏重权威资源的调配,其制定和决策更多是从宏观层面、整体布局上解决问题;而社会政策由于有社会民间组织的积极参与,使得它有可能关注具体而微的个体生活困境,直接面向需要解决困难的社会成员。     

A minimax procedure for electing committees

A new voting procedure for electing committees, called the minimax procedure, is described. Based on approval balloting, it chooses the committee that minimizes the maximum Hamming distance to voters’ ballots, where these ballots are weighted by their proximity to other voters’ ballots. This minimax outcome may be diametrically opposed to the outcome obtained by aggregating approval votes in the usual manner, which minimizes the sum of the Hamming distances and is called the minisum outcome. The manipulability of these procedures, and their applicability when election outcomes are restricted in various ways, are also investigated. The minimax procedure is applied to the 2003 Game Theory Society election of a council of 12 new members from a list of 24 candidates. By rendering outlying voters less influential and not antagonizing any voters too much, it arguably would have produced a committee more representative of the interests of all voters than the minisum committee that was elected.     

Making economic adjustment work: The politics of policy implementation

This article identifies tentative lessons about successful political management of stabilization and structural adjustment policies in developing countries. It addresses three basic questions: 1) What is the purpose of stabilization and structural adjustment policies and what specific measures are usually undertaken? 2) Who, in theory, is supposed to benefit or lose from such policies and who, in actual practice, supports or opposes them? 3) How have governments in developing countries successfully managed the supporters and opponents of adjustment policies? The article concentrates in detail on how the governments of Panama, Costa Rica and Guatemala managed the actual supporters and opponents of these policies between 1982 and 1987, based on interviews with policy makers, official documents and content analysis of media sources, with the aim of determining what measures were implemented, who protested or supported them, and what the government did to build support or minimize opposition. The lessons from these three experiences are tied to the more general literature on successful political management of stabilization and structural adjustment.