Whose Justice? Rethinking Transitional Justice from the Bottom Up

This paper argues that transitional justice needs to adopt a participatory approach to achieve longer-term sustainability, shifting away from the top-down 'one-size-fits-all' approach to allow 'voices from below' to be heard and heeded. It critiques dominant interpretations of key transitional justice concepts, and links them to the difficulties of post-conflict transitional justice in a range of violently divided societies. Popular participation and local agency, it is argued, is necessary to achieve ends identified in much transitional justice discourse, and to embed mechanisms for the creation of sustainable peace. A Northern Ireland initiative (the Ardoyne Commemoration Project) will be explored in-depth, illustrating how a bottom-up 'truth-telling' process can make a significant contribution to transitional justice and casting doubt on the validity of the deference to legal dominance in current policy and practice. The paper recommends that knowledge available in development studies and participatory theory be applied more clearly in debates and approaches in transitional justice.     

The Youth Panorama of Northeast India

The article focuses on youth in Northeast India, particularly its youth panorama by tracing its history as well as the present. Northeast India was one of the last areas to be taken over by the British on the subcontinent. Most of its states share an international border. With 213 tribal communities, 175 languages and many non-tribal communities, the region presents a unique cultural, ethnic, linguistic and religious profile not to be found in any other region in India.     

Klagebefugnis aus dem allgemeinen Willkürverbot bei einem Verstoß gegen die Staatszielbestimmung Umweltschutz

Zusammenfassung Nach einer Entscheidung des Bayerischen Verfassungsgerichtshofs kann ein Bauleitplan wegen Versto? gegen das Willkürverbot aus Gründen des Umweltschutzes nichtig sein. Diese auf eine Popularklage ergangene Entscheidung er?ffnet die Frage, ob der Verfassungsgrundsatz des Willkürverbots auch im Rahmen von Verwaltungsakten herangezogen werden kann. Der Beitrag bejaht diese M?glichkeit.     

Blocks of colour IV: the evidential value of blue and red cotton fibres.

Samples of blue and red cotton fibres were examined using light and fluorescence microscopy as well as UV/VIS microspectrophotometry and fluorescence microspectroscopy. The degree of fluorescence and spectral variation was recorded. Particular attention was paid to the recurrence of certain spectral patterns. The importance of spectral information in the UV range is emphasized again. Colour plays a critical role in the comparison of cotton fibres in forensic sciences. Normally, fibres producing spectral patterns that are frequently seen will tend to have a lower evidential value in criminal cases as the choice of putative sources is theoretically greater and vice versa. Besides black cotton, blue and red cotton fibres are very frequent in fibre casework. The very high discriminating power using a combination of light microscopy, fluorescence microscopy and UV/VIS microspectrophotometry shows that even blue and red cotton fibres can provide excellent evidence when involved in fibre transfer cases.     

Bureaucrats’ corruption and competition in public administration

Competition in public administration is often advocated as a solution to bureaucrats’ corruption. However, there are no well developed analyses of how competition could succeed and the issue of its detailed design has not been carefully addressed so far. In this paper, we put forward a series of models that help understand what competition in public administration can actually accomplish. We distinguish two different shapes that corruption may take: bribery and extortion, and we demonstrate, under the usual assumption of asymmetric information as to the honesty of the bureaucrats, that while competition is effective in fighting extortion it exacerbates bribery. Given that corruption normally manifests itself simultaneously under the two different shapes, an anti-corruption policy based upon competition is bound to face a serious trade-off: trying to curb one of them through competition implies making the other worse. This result holds, with some differences, under exogenous and endogenous bureaucrats’ “honesty”. The dual aspect of corruption is probably one of the most serious—and so far largely neglected—obstacles to any effective anti-corruption policy.