Jury decision making in the capital penalty phase

There are large bodies of research on the deterrent value of the death penalty and public attitudes towards capital punishment. However, little is known about how jurors decide whether a particular defendant should live or die. This article briefly summarizes the case law that attempts to guide the discretion of jurors in the penalty phase of capital murder trials, reviews empirical research on penalty decision making, suggests a methodological strategy for investigating the penalty phase, and identifies several promising directions for future research. Four broad categories of research are identified: the effects of guiding juror discretion, comparisons of juries that vote for life with those that vote for death, the relationship between guilt and penalty phases, and models of decision making in the penalty phase. Several testable hypotheses are proposed.     

Rapid isolation with Sep-Pak C18 cartridges and capillary gas chromatography of triazine herbicides in human body fluids.

A simple and rapid method, for the isolation of eight triazine herbicides from human serum and urine, using Sep-Pak C18 cartridges is presented. After mixing with distilled water, serum and urine samples containing the herbicides, were loaded on Sep-Pak C18 cartridges and eluted with either chloroform only or chloroform/methanol (9:1). The herbicides were detected by capillary gas chromatography with both flame ionization detection (FID) and nitrogen-phosphorus detection (NPD). Separation of eight triazine herbicides from each other and from impurities was generally satisfactory with the use of a non-polar DB-1 capillary column. Recovery of most compounds was excellent for both chloroform and chloroform/methanol (9:1) as elution solvents. Backgrounds were cleaner and evaporation time was shorter for the chloroform only than for the chloroform/methanol (9:1). The NPD gave sensitivity more than 10-20 times higher than that of FID.     

Foreign trading screens in the United States

The first 150 words of the full text of this article appear below. Key points

• Remote trading screens allow investors to trade onexchanges located in other jurisdictions. The Securities andExchange Commission (‘SEC’) has generally prohibitedthe placement of foreign trading screens in the United Statesunless the associated exchange complies with US regulatory requirements.While the SEC defends its position as an essential investorprotection, European officials complain that SEC requirementsconstitute an unfair barrier to trade.
• This article arguesthat technological advances have largely mooted this contro-versy.Current requirements do not protect US investors as much asthe SEC claims nor do they inhibit competition as much as theSEC's critics assert.
• To the extent that alternative tradingmechanisms already give US investors de facto access to unregulatedforeign exchanges, the SEC may well choose to revisit its positionon foreign trading screens, particularly as US and Europeanfinancial markets become more integrated and disclosure requirementson both sides of . . . [Full Text of this Article]