Integration,functional differentiation and problem‐solving in multilevel governance

The European Union (EU) is currently facing unprecedented challenges to its problem‐solving capacity, such as those represented by pressing transnational crises and by bottom‐up criticisms towards the European integration process. Moreover, the EU is said to compensate its weak input legitimacy with an enhanced problem‐solving capacity. However, the notion of problem‐solving itself has remained remarkably vague in the multilevel governance (MLG) literature. This symposium analyses problem‐solving in different MLG settings. In this introduction, we identify procedural and operational notions of problem‐solving in MLG, and present a structural framework to guide the comparative analyses of multilevel systems along the dimensions of political integration, functional differentiation and decentralization. The contributions to the symposium illustrate how structural elements of different multilevel systems shape both the policy‐making process and the politics of problem‐solving within these systems. In doing so, they pave the way for further comparative research.     

Having Your Cake and Eating It,Too: Can Regulatory Agencies Be Both Independent and Accountable?

Independent regulatory agencies (IRAs) were created in various sectors and on different governmental levels to implement liberalization policies. This paper investigates the link between IRAs' independence, which is said to promote regulatory credibility and the use of technical expertise, and their accountability, which is related to the need for controlling and legitimizing independent regulators. The literature on the regulatory state anticipates a positive relation between the independence and accountability of IRAs, but systematic empirical evidence is still lacking. To tackle this question, this paper measures and compares the independence and the accountability of IRAs in three differentially liberalized sectors in Switzerland (telecommunications, electricity and railways). With the application of Social Network Analysis, this piece of research shows that IRAs can be de facto independent and accountable at the same time, but the two features do not necessarily co‐evolve in the same direction.     

The Politics of Network Governance in Europe: The Case of Energy Regulation

Networks are considered increasingly important for policy-making. The literature on new modes of governance in Europe suggests that their horizontal coordination capacity and flexible and informal structures are particularly suitable for governing the multilevel architecture of the European polity. However, empirical evidence about the effects of networks on policy-making and public policies is still quite limited. This article uses the case of the European network of energy regulators to explore the determinants of the position of network members and, in turn, the domestic adoption of soft rules developed within this network. The empirical analysis, based on multivariate statistics and semi-directive interviews, supports the expectation that institutional complementarities increase actors’ centrality in networks, while arguments based on organisational resources and age are disproved. Furthermore, results show that the overall level of adoption is considerable and that centrality might have a small positive effect on domestic adoption.