Unemployment Risks and the Origins of Unemployment Compensation

This paper focuses on the distribution of sectoral unemployment risks and the role of political regimes in the foundational moments of unemployment compensation. The institutionalization of unemployment compensation is a function of two factors. First, it depends on the distribution of unemployment risks by economic sectors. Second, the effect of risk inequality is conditional upon the political regime type. I employ event history analysis of 144 countries throughout the world for the long historical period from 1880 to 2000. The results show that an overall societal level of unemployment risk and inequality of sectoral unemployment risks in a society are positively associated with the likelihood of the institutionalization of unemployment compensation. In addition, the effect of risk inequality is much higher under democracy than under dictatorship. A broader implication is that the creation of unemployment compensation is not only a function of homogeneous working class power but also a function of working class conflict that stems from the heterogeneity of unemployment risks among workers.     

Mainstreaming international governance: The environment,gender, and IO performance in the European Union

International organizations (IOs) have moved increasingly in recent years to adopt cross-cutting mandates that require the “mainstreaming” of particular issues, such as gender equality or environmental protection, across all IO policies. Successful IO performance with respect to such mandates, we hypothesize, is determined in large part by the use of hard or soft institutional measures to shape the incentives of sectoral officials whose cooperation is required for successful implementation. We test this hypothesis with respect to two such mandates—gender mainstreaming and environmental policy integration—in a single international organization, the European Union, demonstrating a strong causal link between the use of hard incentives and IO performance in these and related mandates.     

Measuring Delegation

Principal-agent analyses of delegation to international organizations have advanced our understanding of international cooperation through institutions. However, broader tests of why and when states delegate are not possible without a clear means for objectively identifying and measuring delegation. This paper develops a metric for delegation based upon the services the agent provides to its principals and the resources and autonomy it has to provide those services. This numerical metric is continuous and generalizable to a wide variety of principal-agent relationships. This paper then demonstrates the face validity of the measure with case studies of delegation to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). The paper concludes with a test of Realist and Institutionalist hypotheses for cooperation using the delegation metric, demonstrating the complexity of the underlying reasons we observe delegation.     

Enforcing international environmental cooperation: Technological standards can help

Market instruments, such as emissions trading or pollution taxes, are less costly than “command and control” regulation. Yet technological standards are common in international environmental agreements and now figure prominently among proposals to mitigate global warming. I show that technological standards can be combined with market instruments to create collective enforcement power. They allow states to internationally enforce technology installation, so the payoff to free riding decreases. A notable feature of the argument is that technological standards and market instruments are complements, while previous research has treated them as substitutes. Empirically, technological standards are most valuable if international cooperation is difficult to enforce and the rate of technological change in concerned industries is slow.     

The Baltic as a shipping and information area: the role of Amsterdam in Baltic integration in early modern Europe

In early modern times, the Netherlands imported grain from the Baltic, especially Poland, and re-exported it elsewhere in Europe. The Dutch shipping industry was extremely profitable, for transport costs were very high, and the number of Dutch ships was by far the largest among the European countries. Dutch prosperity was based on shipping of grain from the Baltic. Amsterdam was also a center of information because it was a port at which many ships stayed, and which attracted various merchants owing to its policy of religious tolerance. Much commercial information and know-how were accumulated in and spread from Amsterdam which contributed to the growth of the regional European economy from the Baltic because many merchants migrated to Northern Europe via the city, bringing with them the latest commercial techniques. Amsterdam therefore served as a core of Baltic integration in the early modern period, for it was a center of shipping and information.     

Strengthening the Legitimacy of Representative Democracy: Public Participation,Bipartisan Floor Bills and Plenary Deliberations in the Japanese Diet

It is argued that parliamentary legislation in Japan has become the almost exclusive playing field of the bureaucracy, who acts on behalf of the executive, and party councils. Moreover bureaucrats bypass the legislative Diet process by making rules themselves. This is problematic because it is the lawmakers who are directly held accountable by voters for the enacted legislation risking to be eventually voted out of office. It is suggested that under the given circumstances of strict party discipline, drafting of bills by the bureaucracy and endorsement by party councils, the formal majority rule alone is not sufficient to justify legislative outcomes. The legitimacy factor is introduced to verify in how far individual lawmakers are enabled to initiate and draft floor bills by themselves, discuss bill contents in plenary deliberations and get the public opinion involved. The article attempts to demonstrate that bipartisan floor bills reflect the quest for parliamentary legitimacy and equality among lawmakers across party boundaries. It is suggested that the more legislators participate in drafting and discussing a bill the more legitimate the outcome becomes. The paper screens to this effect several bipartisan bills submitted to the Diet of Japan. Bills such as the NPO law, the law to ratify the Rome Statute for the accession to the ICC, the law to prevent suicide and the law to implement internet filters to protect children are the result of cooperation among lawmakers trying to constrain the interference of the executive or of the powerful bureaucracy. The participation of non-parliamentary agents taking an active part in the legislative process has enhanced the dynamics of representative democracy as well. In the decades of radical ideological confrontation in the 1950s, 60s, and 70s the majority rule risked to become an instrument of coercion. The opposition was compelled to resort to anti-parliamentary obstructionist tactics to derail majority legislation that was rammed through parliament without sufficient plenary deliberation and without taking into account the concerns or viewpoints of the minority. Obstructionism decreased with the LDP co-optation of opposition parties to government responsibility in the 1990s. Opposition for the sake of opposition (communists, DPJ until 2006) and governing for the sake of governing (SDPJ, Komei) have not been honored by the voters. After 2007 the DPJ started to refocus its policies more on ideological differentiation and managed to beat the LDP in the 2009 elections. Recently the work of the Diet has been increasingly put under the scrutiny of international NGOs and legislatures abroad. The unresolved controversial comfort women issue suggests that omission to pass appropriate and timely reconciliatory legislation can cause a serious loss of parliamentary institutional esteem and respect.