Medico-Legal Evaluation of Adolescent Parricide Offenders: Thirty Nine Cases from Turkey

Parricide which is defined as the murder of one’s parents is a rare event. We describe a consecutive series of adolescent parricide offenders referred to the Council of Forensic Medicine for medico-legal evaluation. Majority of the adolescent parricide offenders were male with a frequency of 79.5%. Age of the offenders ranged from 12 to 18 years old with a median age of 15.13. The majority of the victims were the fathers of the offenders (27; 69.2%). Firearms and cutting devices were the most frequently used weapons. The history of abuse in the family as a motive for the murder was detected in 51.2% of the offenders. The major abuse type was physical abuse. There was no history of psychiatric disorders in the majority of the offenders (37; 94.9%). After the medico-legal evaluation of the adolescent parricide offenders in the Council of Forensic Medicine, psychiatric disorder was diagnosed only in 4 offenders. Schizophrenia was the final diagnosis in 3 cases and paranoid disorder (otherwise unclassified) in only 1 offender. Our study confirmed the frequency of mental illness among adolescent parricide offenders to be very low when compared to adult offenders. Adolescent parricide offenders differ from the other perpetrators particularly in terms of motives of the murder and psychiatric illnesses. Abuse in the family seems to play an important role in these murders. Therefore, it is extremely important that individuals in the legal, criminal justice, social work, psychology, educational and other professional communities be more conscious and informed of child maltreatment and family violence and more research is essential in understanding and preventing adolescent parricide offenders.     

The Role of Non -Economic Drivers in Development Planning: The Case of South Korea and Turkey

ABSTRACT

The relationships between economic growth and planning strategies have been debated in different disciplines of social science. However, the emphasis has been more on structural and theoretical assumptions of planning and economics at the expense of other important non-economic and institutional factors that include social, cultural, political, and administrative dimensions. To explain the different approaches and outcomes of development planning, one needs to examine other factors that influence the nature of these plans and why they have been adopted. Using rigorous systematic and thematic review of government reports, academic publications and data from international organizations, this comparative study reveal the unique role non-economic factors play in countries’ development. It has been revealed that these factors not only influence the nature of planning strategies adopted by governments but also affect how these plans are implemented. Since South Korea and Turkey have achieved impressive economic growth over the last half a century, they have been selected as a case study to examine the role non-economic factors in their respective developments.     

Welfare enhancing regulation exemptions

Sanctions for regulation violations are used to deter conduct which could potentially result in great social harms. This practice over-deters low-risk entities and under-deters high-risk entities, which leads to social losses. This paper analyzes whether and how such social losses can be mitigated. I show that this can be achieved by allowing regulatees to purchase passes exempting them from regulations at appropriate prices, although they remain liable for any harm they cause.     

Politics of Constituency Representation and Legislative Ambition under the Glare of Camera Lights

The introduction of legislative television as a transparency initiative has been welcomed in an increasing number of democracies. The impact of television cameras on parliamentary behavior, however, has received scant attention in systems where personal vote-earning attributes are thought to be of little importance (e.g., closed-list proportional representation). Additionally, studies examining this relationship relied exclusively on over-time variation in legislative behavior (i.e., before and after the introduction of television into parliament), which arguably has important deficiencies in demonstrating the true effect of legislative television. Capitalizing on a unique quasi-experimental setting, the present study aims to close these gaps in the literature by analyzing parliamentary activities in Turkey, where the legislative television was restricted to 3 days per week (Tuesday, Wednesday, and Thursday) in 2011 after almost two decades of continuous 7-day operation. Results based on original data sets of parliamentary activities from the pre- and postreform periods (2009–11 and 2011–13) indicate that the varying presence of television cameras exacerbated the effect of electoral and reputation-building motivations on parliamentary behavior, encouraging electorally unsafe and junior MPs to shift their constituency focus to the televised proceedings. The results offer important implications for the study of legislative transparency and constituency representation in party-list proportional representation systems.     

Conquering versus democratizing the state: political Islamists and fourth wave democratization in Turkey and Tunisia

What do we learn from Turkey and Tunisia regarding the relationship between political Islamism and democratization? Variables identified by current research such as autonomy, “moderation”, and cooperation with secular actors can cut both ways depending on various political-institutional conditions and prerogatives. Particularly, the article argues that preoccupation with “conquering the state from within as opposed to democratizing it” has been a key priority and intervening variable undermining the democratizing potential of the main Turkish and Tunisian political Islamic actors – primarily the AKP and Ennahda. These actors have prioritized acceptance by and ownership of their respective nation states over other goals and strategies, such as revolutionary takeover or Islamization of the state and confrontations with state elites. This has led to a relative neglect of designing and building institutions, whether for Islamic or democratic transformation. Hence, while contributing to democratization at various stages, these actors have a predisposition to adopt and regenerate, reframe and at times augment the authoritarian properties of their states. Research should ask how secular and religious actors can agree on institutions of vertical and horizontal state accountability that would help to address the past and present sources of the interest of political Islamists in conquering rather than democratizing the state.     

The Impact of Military Interventions on the Integration of Muslim Immigrants in Western Countries, 1990–2013

While there is an indication that some democratic institutions and public policies have been effective in integrating ethnic minorities, social classes and immigrants in Western countries, recent studies show that they have not succeeded equally in incorporating Muslim immigrants. This difference begs the question of what particular circumstances are required for Muslim integration in the West. This article uses the level of violence between Muslim immigrants and host societies as an indication of their social cohesion or lack thereof. Conducting a quantitative analysis of 16 Western countries for the period 1990–2013, we find that militarised interstate disputes between Western states and predominantly Muslim countries substantially increase the likelihood of violence between Muslim immigrants and the respective host societies. Multicultural policies and consensual political systems mitigate these adverse effects. This study demonstrates a continued utility of democratic institutions and public policies towards promoting social cohesion, especially when the host states are engaged in military action in Muslim countries.     

Moderate Islam and secularist opposition in Turkey: implications for the world,Muslims and secular democracy

Developing an argument based in theories of democratic consolidation and religious competition, and discussing the reasons for the secularist opposition to the government, this article analyses how government by a party rooted in moderate Islamism may affect Turkey's peculiar secular democracy, development and external relations and how Muslims in the world relate to modernization and democracy. Arguing that secularism in advanced democracies may be a product of democracy as much as it is the other way around, the article maintains that democratic consolidation may secure further consolidation of Turkish secularism and sustainable moderation of Turkish political Islam. Besides democratic Islamic – conservative actors and other factors, democratic consolidation requires strong democratic – secularist political parties so that secularist and moderate Islamist civilian actors check and balance each other. Otherwise, middle class value divisions and mistrust in areas like education and social regulation may jeopardise democratisation and economic modernisation and continuing reconciliation of Islamism with secular democracy and modernity.     

Foreigners Dying in Istanbul

Abstract:  The study included 411 deaths selected from 14,647 medicolegal deaths autopsied in the Morgue Department of Forensic Medicine Institute Directorate, affiliated with the Ministry of Justice, between 1998 and 2002. Data were collected from court documents, coroner's investigation reports, and autopsy reports. The parameters of age, gender, nationality and origin, cause and place of death in foreigners dying in Istanbul were evaluated in the study. Out of 14,647 medicolegal deaths, 3.5% were foreigners from 34 different nationalities. The nationality with the highest rate of foreigner deaths (34%) was Romanian. Out of 411 deaths, 74.3% were male and 25.7% were female. Of all cases, 64.4% were tourists visiting Istanbul and 35.6% had a job in Istanbul. Of 146 foreigners employed in Istanbul, 94.5% did not have a work permit, while only 5.5% had a work permit.