How stable is party identification?

This essay refines and extends our argument (Green and Palmquist, 1990) that net of the distorting effects of measurement error, Americans' partisanship tends to be highly stable over time. Three challenges to this thesis are addressed. In response to doubts about the generalizability of our earlier findings to panel studies of longer duration or from other eras, we show that nine multi-wave panel studies yield similar results. Next, we take up the question of whether our model can account for observed patterns of partisan conversion. The rate of party-switching forces some modifications in the statistical assumptions used to model party identification over time, but a revised model which can account for inter-party change reproduces earlier findings of partisan stability. Third, we grapple with the question of how our findings square with fluctuations in what has been termed macropartisanship. We suggest that aggregate shifts in party identification need not be incompatible with strong over-time correlations at the individual level. Finally, we develop a simulation of micropartisanship to illustrate that over long stretches of time very gradual changes in partisanship can accumulate to produce appreciable levels of micropartisan change.Donald Philip Green, Yale University.Bradley Palmquist, Harvard University.An earlier version of this paper was presented at the annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Chicago, Illinois, September 3–6, 1992.     

Urban women's informal savings and credit systems in Zambia

This article is based on findings from semi-structured interviews and discussions among "chilimba" groups in Zambia. Chilimba groups are primarily women's groups that engage in credit and savings programs. Group membership ranges from 4 to 20 members. The women agree on a fixed, regular cash contribution that is given in turn to each member in a specified order. Market groups tend to be larger and contributions of about a dollar are made daily. Smaller groups tend to make larger, but less frequent contributions. Default is rare, as the commitment is taken very seriously. New members are added at the end of the rotation. Loans can be used for domestic or business use. Chilimba groups are evidence that very poor people desire savings. Chilimba brings together people with similar financial needs and resources. Chilimba does not require formal, written procedures or formal institutional frameworks. Chilimba is not a remedy for reducing overall poverty. It is appropriate only for people with some regular source of income. It does not serve as a safety net in emergencies. Long-term loans are not possible. A limitation is its openness and lack of structure that permit potential abuse. It is a livelihood strategy for women, but benefits could be gained from including men. It is urged that groups consider whether the position of the poor is being enhanced or undermined. Different models need to be tested. Members themselves must decide on the type and phasing of activities.