Book reviews

Foreign Policy Making in Developing States: a comparative approach. Edited by Christopher Clapham, Farnborough (UK): Saxon House. 1978. 148 pp. £8.50.

Tariff Protection and Growth in Developing Countries. Mona Fouad Attia, Rotterdam: Rotterdam University Press. 1976. 251 pp.

Exports of Manufactures from Developing Countries. A H M Mahfuzur Rahman, Rotterdam: Centre for Development Planning, Rotterdam University Press. 1973. 140 pp.

Policy Reform in Developing Countries. Bela Balassa, Oxford: Pergamon Press. 1977. 176 pp. £9.00. £5.95 pb.

Nuclear Proliferation and the Near‐Nuclear Countries. Edited by Onkar Marwah & Ann Schultz, Cambridge, Massachusetts: Ballinger. 1975. 350 pp £11.60. (Distributed in UK by John Wiley)

Sociology and Development. Edited by E de Kadt and G Williams, London: Tavistock Publications Ltd. 1974. (Reprinted 1976). 374 pp. £4.25.

An Introduction to the Sociology of Rural Development. Norman Long, London: Methuen &Co Ltd. 1977. 221 pp. £3.25 pb.

Growing out of Poverty. Elizabeth Stamp, Oxford: Oxford University Press. 1977. 165 pp. £4.25.

The United Nations System: coordinating its economic and social work. Martin Hill, Cambridge University Press. 1978. 252 pp. £13.50.

The United Nations in Bangladesh. Thomas W Oliver, Princeton University Press. 1978. 231 pp. US$20.

International Money: issues and analysis. Andrew Crockett, London: Thomas Nelson & Sons. 1978. 250 pp. £3.95 pb.

The Failure of World Monetary Reform 1971–74. John Williamson, London: Thomas Nelson & Sons. 1977. 221 pp. £3.25.

The International Monetary Tangle: myths and realities. Guillaume Guindey, Oxford: Blackwells. 1977. 121 pp. £7.85.

Research and Development Abroad by US Multinationals. Robert Ronstadt, New York: Praeger. 1977. 150 pp. £11.25.

International Migration and Dependence. Stephen Adler, Farnborough (UK): Saxon House. 1977. 235 pp. £8.50.

The Seventh Enemy: the human factor in the global crisis. Ronald Higgins, London: Hodder and Stoughton. 1978. 303 pp. £5.95.

The Disintegrating West. Mary Kaldor, London: Allen Lane‐Penguin Books Ltd. 1978. 219 pp. £5.50.

The Changing Face of the Third World: regional and national studies. Edited by Josef Nyilas, Budapest: Department of World Economy, Karl Marx University of Economic. Sciences. 1978. 431 pp.

Interdependent Development. Harold Brookfield, London: Methuen. 1977. 233 pp. £3.30.

Oil Companies in the International System. Louis Turner, London: George Allen &Unwin. 1978. 222 pp. £8.50.

Venezuela's Oil. Romullo Betancourt, London: George Allen & Unwin. 1978. 275 pp. £3.95.

Namibia Old and New. Gerhard Tötemeyer, London: C Hurst & Company Ltd. 1978. 257 pp. £9.50.

Buying Time in South Africa. CIS Anti‐Report No. 21, London: Counter Information Services. 1978. 56 pp. £0.95 pb.

Revolutionary Pressures in Africa. Claude Ake, London: Zed Press Ltd. 1978. 109 pp. £6.50.

The Guerilla Reader: a historical anthology. Edited by Walter Laqueur, London: Wildwood House. 1978. 246 pp. £5.95.

Negotiating Third World Mineral Agreements: promises as prologue. David N Smith and Louis T Wells Jr., Cambridge, Massachusetts: Ballinger Publishing Company. 1975. 266 pp. £10.80. (Distributed in the UK by John Wiley)

Economic Growth and Distribution in China. Nicholas R Lardy, Cambridge University Press. 1978. 244 pp. £12.

The Peasant and the Raj: studies in agrarian society and peasant rebellion in colonial India. Eric Stokes, Cambridge University Press. 1978. 308 pp. £12.50.

Women of the World: illusion and reality. Urmila Phadnis and Indira Malani, New Delhi: Vikas Publishing House. 1978. 283 pp.

Message from the Village. Perdita Huston, New York: Epoch B Foundation. 1978. 120 pp. US $3.95.

Living Black. Kevin Gilbert, London: Allen Lane ‐ the Penguin Press. 1977. 305 pp. £7.00.

The Economics of the Arab World. Yusif A Sayigh, London: Croom Helm. 1978. 726 pp. £35.

The Determinants of Arab Economic Development. Yusif A Sayigh, London: Croom Helm. 1978. 181 pp. £12.95.

The Arabs’ New Frontier. Robert Stephens, London: Temple Smith (second revised edition). 1976. 279 pp. £5.50.

Emergency in Perspective; reprieve and challenge. Sachchidanand Sinha, London: Books from India Ltd. 1977. 122 pp. £3.75.

Inside India Today. Dilip Hiro, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. 1976. (reprinted 1978) 293 pp. £3.95 pb.

The Essential JP: the philosophy and prison diary of Jayaprakash Narayan. Edited by Satish Kumar, Dorchester (UK): Prism Press. 1978. 153 pp. £4.95.

Women of Vietnam. Arlene Eisen Bergman, San Francisco: People's Press. 1975 (revised edition). 255 pp. £2.95.. (Distributed in the UK by Zed Press)

Land and Labour in Latin America. Edited by Kenneth Duncan and Ian Rutledge with the collaboration of Colin Harding Cambridge Latin American Studies, Cambridge University Press. 1977. 535 pp. £17.50.

Secession: the legitimacy of self‐determination. Lee C Buchheit, New Haven: Yale University Press. 1978. 260 pp. £12.60.     

Do Nuclear Weapons Stabilize South Asian Militarized Crises? Evidence from the 1990 Case

Abstract

Scholars have claimed that nuclear weapons help to stabilize South Asia by preventing Indo-Pakistani militarized crises from escalating to the level of all-out conventional war. This article argues that while nuclear weapons have had cautionary effects on Indian and Pakistani decision makers, proliferation also has played a role in fomenting some of the very crises that scholars credit nuclear weapons with defusing. Moreover, nuclear deterrence was not always essential to preventing these crises from escalating to the level of outright war. The article illustrates its argument with evidence from the Indo-Pakistani militarized crisis of 1990.

Leading scholars and analysts have argued that nuclear weapons help to prevent South Asian militarized crises from escalating to the level of all-out conventional war. ¹ 1. See, e.g., Sumit Ganguly, Conflict Unending: India-Pakistan Tensions Since 1947 (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2002), pp. 109–110; Devin Hagerty, The Consequences of Nuclear Proliferation: Lessons from South Asia (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1998), pp. 133–170; Kenneth N. Waltz, “For Better,” in Scott D. Sagan and Kenneth N. Waltz, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A Debate Renewed (New York: Norton, 2003), pp. 109–124; K. Subrahmanyam, “India and the International Nuclear Order,” in D. R. SarDesai and G. C. Raju Thomas, eds., Nuclear India in the Twenty-First Century (New York: Palgrave-Macmillan, 2002), pp. 63–84, at pp. 82–83; Raja Menon, A Nuclear Strategy for India (New Delhi: Sage Publications, 2000), pp. 197–198. A considerable literature exists regarding nuclear weapons’ general effects on the South Asian security environment. Scholars optimistic that nuclear weapons will help to pacify South Asia include Waltz, “For Better”; Hagerty, The Consequences of Nuclear Proliferation; John J. Mearsheimer, “Here We Go Again,” New York Times, May 17, 1998; Subrahmanyam, “India and the International Nuclear Order”; Bharat Karnad, Nuclear Weapons and Indian Security: The Realist Foundations of Strategy (New Delhi: Macmillan India, 2002). Scholars pessimistic as to nuclear weapons’ likely effects on the regional security environment include Scott D. Sagan, “For the Worse: Till Death Do Us Part,” in Sagan and Waltz, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons; P. R. Chari, “Nuclear Restraint, Nuclear Risk Reduction, and the Security–Insecurity Paradox in South Asia,” in Michael Krepon and Chris Gagné, eds., The Stability–Instability Paradox: Nuclear Weapons and Brinksmanship in South Asia (Washington, DC: The Stimson Center, 2001), pp. 15–36; Kanti Bajpai, “The Fallacy of an Indian Deterrent,” in Amitabh Mattoo, ed., India’s Nuclear Deterrent: Pokhran II and Beyond (New Delhi: HarAnand, 1999); Samina Ahmed, “Security Dilemmas of Nuclear-Armed Pakistan,” Third World Quarterly Vol. 21, No. 5 (October 2000), pp. 781–793; S. R. Valluri, “Lest We Forget: The Futility and Irrelevance of Nuclear Weapons for India,” in Raju G.C. Thomas and Amit Gupta, eds., India’s Nuclear Security (United States: Lynne Rienner, 2000), pp. 263–273. This claim has important implications for the regional security environment and beyond. Given the volatile nature of Indo-Pakistani relations, reducing the likelihood of crisis escalation would make the subcontinent significantly safer. The claim also suggests that nuclear weapons could lower the probability of war in crisis-prone conflict dyads elsewhere in the world.

This article takes a less sanguine view of nuclear weapons’ impact on South Asian militarized crises. It argues that while nuclear weapons have at times had important cautionary effects on Indian and Pakistani decision makers, proliferation has played a role in fomenting a number of the very crises that scholars credit nuclear weapons with defusing. Moreover, it is not clear that nuclear deterrence was essential to preventing some of these crises from escalating to the level of outright war. I illustrate my argument with evidence from the period when India and Pakistan were acquiring nascent nuclear weapons capabilities. I show that during the late 1980s, Pakistan’s emerging nuclear capacity emboldened Pakistani decision makers to provide extensive support to the emerging insurgency against Indian rule in Jammu and Kashmir. In early 1990, India responded with large-scale force deployments along the Line of Control and International Border, in an attempt to stem militant infiltration into Indian territory, and potentially to intimidate Pakistan into abandoning its Kashmir policy. Pakistan countered with large deployments of its own, and the result was a major Indo-Pakistani militarized standoff. Although scholars have credited Pakistani nuclear weapons with deterring India from attacking Pakistan during this crisis, the preponderance of available evidence suggests that Indian leaders never seriously considered striking Pakistan, and therefore were not in fact deterred from launching a war in 1990. Thus nuclear weapons played an important role in fomenting a major Indo-Pakistani crisis during this period, but probably were not instrumental in preventing the crisis from escalating to the level of outright war.

Below, I briefly describe the emergence of the Kashmir insurgency. I then explain how Pakistan’s nuclear capacity encouraged it to support the uprising. Next, I show how conflict between Pakistan-supported guerillas and Indian security forces in Kashmir drove a spiral of tension between the two countries, which led to a stand-off between Indian and Pakistani armed forces in early 1990. Finally, I discuss the end of the 1990 crisis, and address the role that nuclear weapons played in its peaceful deescalation.     

Getting India Back to the Growth Turnpike: What Will It Take?

India’s real GDP growth has slipped substantially since the onset of the North Atlantic financial crisis (NAFC). There are questions as to whether growth can be revived back to the high growth phase of 2003–2008 in an environment of macroeconomic and financial stability. This article argues that returning India to a high growth turnpike is quite feasible but it will need much more focused attention to the revival of manufacturing and to accelerate investment in transport and infrastructure. The immediate priority is to achieve the kind of fiscal quality and low inflation level that was exhibited during 2003–2008, with focused attention to increasing efficiency and compliance in tax revenue collection Higher tax revenues can facilitate increases in public investment for the delivery of public goods and services, which then crowd in private investment. However, the task ahead will be more difficult now in view of the protracted slow-down in global economic growth and in global trade.     

Improving Data Quality: Actors, Incentives, and Capabilities

Devesh Kapur Centre for Advanced Study of India, University of Pennsylvania, 3600 Market Street, Suite 560, Philadelphia, PA 19104 e-mail: dkapur{at}sas.upenn.edu e-mail: herrera{at}fas.harvard.edu (corresponding author) This paper examines the construction and use of data sets inpolitical science. We focus on three interrelated questions:How might we assess data quality? What factors shape data quality?and How can these factors be addressed to improve data quality?We first outline some problems with existing data set quality,including issues of validity, coverage, and accuracy, and wediscuss some ways of identifying problems as well as some consequencesof data quality problems. The core of the paper addresses thesecond question by analyzing the incentives and capabilitiesfacing four key actors in a data supply chain: respondents,data collection agencies (including state bureaucracies andprivate organizations), international organizations, and finally,academic scholars. We conclude by making some suggestions forimproving the use and construction of data sets. Authors' note: For generous comments at many stages in the paper,the authors would like to thank Dawn Brancati, Bear Braumoeller,Kanchan Chandra, Jorge Dominguez, Errol D'Souza, Richard Grossman,Ana Grzymala-Busse, Andrew Kydd, David Laitin, Daniel Posner,Jasjeet Sekhon, Hillel Soifer, Jessica Wallack, and Steven Wilkinsonand the Comparative Politics Research Workshop at Harvard University,and the anonymous reviewers from Political Analysis. The authorstake full responsibility for any errors. An earlier versionof this paper was presented at the American Political ScienceAssociation Annual Meetings, Boston, MA, August 2002.