Some observations on the link between learning disabilities and juvenile delinquency

In order to test the hypothesis that learning disabilities are related to juvenile delinquency, a sample of 1,005 public school and 687 adjudicated juvenile delinquent youths (ages 12 to 17) reported about delinquent behaviors in which they had engaged. The youths' educational records were screened, and, if the presence of learning disabilities could not be discounted, the children were given a series of tests. Every child was classified as either learning disabled or not. The results indicated that proportionately more adjudicated delinquent children than public school children were learning disabled. Self-report data, however, showed no differences in delinquent behaviors engaged in by learning-disabled and non-learning-disabled children, within either the adjudicated or public school samples. Public school children who have learning disabilities reported that they were picked up by the police at about the same rate as non-learning-disabled children, and engaged in about the same delinquent behaviors. Charges for which learning-disabled and non-learning-disabled adjudicated delinquents were convicted followed the same general patterns. In light of these findings, it was proposed that the greater proportion of learning-disabled youth among adjudicated juvenile delinquents may be accounted for by differences in the way such children are treated within the juvenile justice system, rather than by differences in their delinquent behaviors.     

On the economic incentives for taking bribes

This paper presents an empirical analysis of the factors affecting bribe taking by public officials. Factors influencing the acceptance of bribes include: the probability of being convicted, severity of punishment, government salary relative to private sector income, the demonstration effect, and the unemployment rate. Our results indicate that higher probability of being convicted discourages the acceptance of bribes as does more severe punishment. Low relative earnings, high unemployment, and the demonstration effect of aggregate advertising all lead to increased bribe taking.     

‘We have not made anybody homeless’: regulation and control of urban life in Zimbabwe

In May and June 2005, thousands of Zimbabweans were brutally displaced from urban areas. But ‘Operation Murambatsvina’ was not simply an unpredictable ‘tsunami,’ rather it provides a moment in which long-held prejudices and assumptions which shaped the developmental state became visible, reflecting not just the internalisation of the Rhodesian, modernist world-view, but also its imbrication with local understandings of home and home-ness. To see Murambatsvina as simply a politically expedient move is to miss the deep resonance of the political rhetoric, the ways it was embedded in the state, and how it is shaped by norms of citizenship. Contextualised against Harare's urban politics, the clearances reveal a long-standing set of policies designed to regulate and control urban life, forming part of a broader crisis of the post-colonial developmental state.     

Staying sincere: an experimental analysis of non-strategic voting in South Korea

Under ideal conditions, when do voters switch from sincere to strategic voters? Despite a large literature on strategic voting and Duverger’s Law, few studies assess when individuals shift from sincere to strategic nor what factors may encourage or discourage defecting from one’s first choice. Through an experimental web survey analysing district voting in South Korea’s National Assembly, this study measures the effect of partisan cues and the margin of error. Not only did a non-negligible number of respondents remain sincere voters despite conditions favourable to strategic voting, but supporters of smaller parties and those without partisan identification were more likely to defect from their sincere vote when given an additional prompt about the margin of error. The results suggest the contextual influence on the strategic vote calculus.