Do Authoritarian Institutions Constrain? How Legislatures Affect Economic Growth and Investment

This article explores why authoritarian regimes create legislatures and then assesses their effect on economic growth and investment. In authoritarian regimes more dependent on domestic investment than natural resource revenue, the dictator creates a binding legislature as a credible constraint on the regime's confiscatory behavior. In regimes dependent on natural resource revenue, the nonbinding legislature serves as a mechanism for the dictator to bribe and split the opposition when he faces credible challenges to the regime. Using data from 121 authoritarian regimes from 1950 to 2002, the results indicate that binding legislatures have a positive impact on economic growth and domestic investment, while nonbinding legislatures have a negative impact on economic growth.     

Crossing roads,crossing boundaries: empowerment and participation in a child pedestrian safety initiative

Children's journeys between home and school have become increasingly problematic in Western cities as a result of intensifying traffic and safety concerns. Many parents now take their children to school by car and, through driving, exacerbate congestion. In response to this situation, a number of school communities, in partnership with local authorities, have established walking school buses (WSBs). In this paper the WSB phenomenon is critiqued, with particular reference to the initiative adopted by a primary school in Auckland, New Zealand. It is concluded that WSBs offer participants a highly ambivalent form of empowerment and spatial freedom that is contingent upon adult surveillance and disciplinary power.     

Organising development: Comparing the national systems of entrepreneurship in Sweden and South Korea

The dominant paradigms of economic development have created an artificial institutional division between spontaneous markets and instrumental states. Opposing policy agendas have evolved and remain entrenched. This article seeks to challenge both approaches by reconsidering the role of entrepreneurship in economic development. Adopting an evolutionary perspective, it argues that a national system of entrepreneurship provides an appropriate framework for combining the creative and destructive processes inherent in entrepreneurship with the institutional diversity characteristic of successful economic development. The article illustrates this argument by comparing the development experiences of Sweden and South Korea.     

Pivotal states in the Electoral College, 1880 to 2004

This paper presents an empirical measure of pivoting in the electoral college from 1880 to 2004. The measure derives from established theoretical concepts of power and pivoting first introduced by Shapley and Shubik (Am. Political Sci. Rev. 84:787–792, 1954). Pivotal states identified by this approach generally conform to popular interpretations—Ohio in 2004, Florida in 2000, and so forth—but, historically, pivotal states are also frequently small or medium-sized states. Also, pivotal states by this approach are not necessarily competitive states. In general, whether or not a state is pivotal is mainly a function of its size and bellwether tendency—i.e., its tendency to mirror the national voting trend. A state’s pivot position is also an excellent predictor of how presidential candidates allocated time and money across states in the general elections of 2000 and 2004. Controlling for a state’s pivot position, size and electoral competitiveness have little effect on the allocation of campaign resources.     

The regulatory state and the UK Labour Government's re‐regulation of provision in the English National Health Service

Following its election in 1997, the UK Labour Government embarked upon a 10 year program of reform of the National Health Service (NHS). By 2005, Labour had doubled the NHS budget and dramatically transformed the shape of the Service. In England, a basic characteristic of the NHS is the organizational split between provider and commissioning agencies. In this article I argue that Labour's re‐regulation of NHS provision is a coherent representation of the influence of the “regulatory state” in restructuring arrangements between government, market, and society. The article offers an account of the regulatory state based on a discussion of five key theses: The Audit Society, Regulation Inside Government, The New Regulatory State, The British Regulatory State, and Regulatory Capitalism. The article unfolds Labour's program of reform across themes common to these accounts: the division of labor between state and society, the division of labor within the state, the formalization of previously informal controls, and the development of meta‐regulatory techniques of enforced self‐regulation. It concludes that the key themes of the regulatory state are at work in Labour's transformation of NHS provision and it offers a discussion of the implications for both scholars of regulation and the UK and European health policy literature.     

The ‘I’ and the ‘we’ of citizenship in the age of waning democracy: Wolin and Balibar on citizenship,the political and dedemocratization

Despite drawing on different historical traditions and philosophical sources, Sheldon Wolin and Étienne Balibar have come to see citizenship and democracy in fundamentally similar ways. However, the work of one has not been considered alongside that of the other. In this paper, I examine some of their key texts and draw out three areas of common concern: the historical specificity of the political, citizenship as a dialectical process and dedemocratization. The significance of Wolin and Balibar’s writing on citizenship and democracy lies in a set of proposals for the eternal rebirth of the citizen as democratic agent between action and institution, hierarchy and equality, individual and community, difference and the universal. Their open-ended frameworks can be seen as an antidote to contemporary pessimism about the fate of democracy as either political order or normative ideal. I conclude by suggesting that contemporary Ecuadorean and Bolivian debates about how to combine relational ontologies and liberalism has opened a fertile domain for re-imagining the I and We of citizenship.     

Accountability and Coalitions: Evidence from a Negotiation Experiment

This article tests the effect of accountability on negotiation outcomes in a face‐to‐face classroom experiment. Student participants were asked to form coalitions in groups of three. In the treatment condition, negotiators were held accountable by a personal forum during the formation of the coalition. In the control condition, negotiators were not held accountable. Results show that accountability leads to lower group performance in coalition negotiations. Accountability also reduced the willingness of negotiators to include all negotiators in a “grand coalition.” Rather, accountable negotiators reached agreement with a subset of negotiators. Accountability increased the odds of reaching no agreement. These findings challenge the idea of increased performance as a result of public accountability in the context of coalition negotiations.