Child Abuse,Neglect, and Dependency Mediation Pilot Project

The Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997 (ASFA) established a goal of one year from removal to permanence for all children taken into protective custody. When the Family Court of Mecklenburg County (Charlotte), N.C., opened its doors in 1999, more than half of the children in the protective custody of the Department of Social Services had been in custody for 12 months or more. Innovative approaches were needed to provide children in Mecklenburg County with a safe and permanent home in a more timely manner. The Child Abuse, Neglect, and Dependency Mediation Pilot Project was one approach selected by the Mecklenburg County Family Court to help achieve ASFA's goal of one year to permanence. This article details the court's two‐year journey to make dependency mediation a reality.     

Transnational Jihadism and the Role of Criminal Judges: An Ethnography of French Courts

Lower national courts are increasingly asked to perform a transnational role, being directly involved in major geopolitical issues such as conflicts, migration, and transnational terrorism. Based on an ethnography of French criminal courts, this article aims to examine this emerging role of national lower courts as transnationalized players. Through an examination of terrorism prosecutions in France and the positions of the different judicial actors, it is argued that lower criminal courts, acting within a transnational context, can offer more robust resistance to states’ policies than supreme courts. This is because of the routine and the banality of their function and the direct interaction with the accused persons coupled with the judges’ own professional ethos and notion of judicial independence. Unlike supreme courts, whose role is more visible, and thus under the constant scrutiny of the political branches of the state, lower courts can operate in a more distant, independent space.     

Why the “Haves” Do Not Necessarily Come Out Ahead in Informal Dispute Resolution

This article explores the implications of Galanter's distinction between repeat and one‐off players to informal dispute resolution settings. Relying on quantitative and qualitative data regarding one British “private‐Ombudsman” scheme, the article analyzes the extent to which complaint handlers' decision making advantaged more experienced and better resourced firms and/or high‐status and more assertive complainants. The article's tentative theoretical proposition is that the typically indeterminate nature of informal dispute resolution settings renders them less susceptible to large organizations' and other repeat players' capacity to “play for rules.” Yet, this indeterminacy makes such processes more vulnerable to decision makers' reliance on heuristics.