Corporatism and Planning in London in the 1980s

This study confirms the existence of corporatist forms of interest intermediation at the micro level of four local planning authorities in London. In all four boroughs distinctions could be drawn between local business associations and metic, non-local firms. The former displayed most of the institutional characteristics outlined by Schmitter in his original definition of corporatism. In contrast the non-local or metic firms did not exhibit all these institutional characteristics at the level of local government. The conditions under which they bargained with local planning authorities (LPAs) were often influenced by statutory and other requirements handed down from central government. These requirements were themselves often the result of corporatist interest intermediation at the level of the central state. Both local business associations (LBAs) and metic production organizations (MPOs) were required by (LPAs) to implement planning policies. This process has increased in importance during the Thatcher era. Economic decline has made the local planning authorities even more dependent on private organizations for implementation than before. Local LBAs and MPOs were granted privileged access to the planning system. Only the LBAs were granted representational monopolies for their very local areas in this process. MPOs developed representational oligopolies but because they were so few in number they could be in conflict with one another over the rights to develop a particular site. In return for these representational privileges both the LBAs and MPOs were expected to moderate their demands for major departures from the approved local plans. The methods used to intermediate interests to the local planning systems were primarily informal. Although a small number of formal meetings were held each year between external organizations and the LPAs they represented a minority of the contacts between them and representatives of both LBAs and MPOs. Informal bargaining took place in two ways. First, there were issue specific negotiations over particular developments. The second type of contact was long-term, non-issue specific and primarily concerned with network building. Both types of bargaining were relatively secret and involved only the top echelons of the organizations concerned.     

TEN YEARS AFTER: THE US CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET AND IMPOUNDMENT CONTROL ACT OF 1974

The reformed congressional budget process is no longer new. This fact alone invites an assessment of the experience of budgeting under the procedures enacted in 1974. But there is a more pressing reason for undertaking such an assessment. Today, there is widespread unhappiness with the congressional budget process. In recent years the deadlines of the budget process have repeatedly not been met, resulting in incomplete budgeting and the proliferation of proposals to abolish or reform the budget procedures enacted in 1974.
Consequently, this paper will first outline the reformed budget procedures and establish the goals of the 1974 Budget Act. The second section assesses whether the goals of budget reform have been achieved. In short, the answer is a negative one. The third section explains why the goals of budget reform have not been met, and the final section evaluates the main proposals advanced for changing the budget process.