Post-development theory and the question of alternatives: a view from Africa

Post-development theorists have declared development obsolete and bankrupt and have called for ‘alternatives to development’. What do they mean by such calls and what should be the African response to such calls? In this paper I will attempt to address three important questions: first, what is meant by post-development theory's call for ‘alternatives to development’? Second, why consider post-development theory from an African perspective? Third, what contributions can a consideration of African difference and diversity make towards debate on ‘alternatives to development’? I conclude by arguing that increased consideration of the African experience would be valuable for all who are seeking alternative ways of dealing with the problems that development purports to address.     

The challenge of design of intergovernmental relations in economies in transition

The governments of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union are at a crucial juncture in their movement from highly centralized command economies to more decentralized market economies. While there is a belief in these countries that decentralization brings greater economic efficiency, the reality is that such a transition is a difficult process. This paper examines what types of administrative reforms are needed for the decentralization process, how far along the countries are with respect to these reforms, and what reforms are missing. As we discuss, many of the necessary administration reforms are missing and we argue that more attention must be paid to these elements for successful decentralization of these governments.

This paper examines the recent experience and reform needs of the key administrative aspects of the design of intergovernmental relations in countries in transition in Eastern Europe and in the former Soviet Union. There is a widespread realization in all of these countries that decentralizing government will help increase efficiency in the public sector just as privatization will improve efficiency in their economies. Decentralization of government operations is also attractive as a way to cement a democratic form of government. Despite the appearances of the existence of an already decentralized system, such as in the case of the Soviet Union, this experiment started in practically all cases with a lack of institutions and experience on how decentralized government operations should be organized.

As different as these countries are, there are many similarities in the reform process they are following in order to decentralize government structure. While the basic components of a decentralized system of government are emerging in many of these countries the structure of government has not fully evolved in a manner that can support such a decentralized system. Often, governments remain structured along a vertical hierarchy: information, budgetary authority, and revenue pass from the central government down to subnational levels of government while little communication or interaction exists at a horizontal level. In general, the assignment of revenue and expenditure has not been clearly defined among the two or three levels of government, central government transfers continue to occur in a relatively ad hoc manner, and the entire budgeting system still rests in many cases on more or less formal system of negotiations and bargaining among the different levels of government. There has been some change in this structure in certain countries. Over the last three years, both Poland and Hungary have legally increased the automony of subnational governments. In 1994 in Russia a new and more transparent system of intergovernmental grants has been established between the federal government and the regions. In 1994 also, Latvia introduced a more transparent formula-driven, transfer formula for the regional and municipal governments.

The focus of this paper is to develop a “blue print” for necessary changes in organization and administration of intergovernmental relations in countries in transition. While many experts have recently been discussing the public finance policy components of this new, evolving relationship among levels of government, less attention has been paid to the structural and administrative challenges and the information design issues that must be met in order to develop and support a system of intergovernmental relations.

The paper is organized as follows: First we review the major responsibilities and their allocation among levels of government, the assignment of revenue sources, and the system of transfers. We then turn to a discussion of the current experience of Eastern European and NIS countries in the context of the structural components of an intergovernmental fiscal system. Next, we analyze the organizational reforms that are necessary for the efficient functioning of a decentralized system of government in the economies in transition. Finally we “rate” the transition economies in relation to their current design of the system of intergovernmental relations and support mechanisms.     

The unavailability of information on insurance unavailability: Insurance redlining and the absence of geocoded disclosure data

Abstract

The availability of insurance in urban communities has long been a contested public policy issue. One of the central points of contention has been the value of publicly available data on the geographic distribution of property insurance policies. This debate has intensified since the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act, which requires geocoded disclosure of mortgage lending activity, was passed. A small number of states have required disclosure of limited data. But precisely what data are available has been unclear, and their utility has been debated.

This survey of all state insurance commissioners documents what is in fact the very limited availability of insurance disclosure data. Only eight states require any disclosure of geocoded data, and just four of them make company‐level data available to the public. Data from one of those states, Wisconsin, are used to show how such data could benefit insurers, consumers, and regulators.     

Rationalizing criminal behaviour: the influence of criminal sentiments on sociomoral development in violent offenders and nonoffenders

Cognitive developmental theory suggests that mature-level sociomoral reasoning (Stages 3 and 4) can provide a protective factor, or buffer, against antisocial and violent criminal behavior. This study explored whether the influence of internalised criminal sentiments could undermine this buffer. The sample was high-risk men and women offenders (n = 99) convicted of serious violent index offences, and men and women nonoffender university students (n = 101). Moral reasoning was measured using the Sociomoral Reflection Measure-Short Form, whereas criminal sentiments were assessed using the Criminal Sentiments Scale. Based on moral reasoning development level the sample was classified into groups: mature- or immature-level moral reasoners. The results suggested that mature-level sociomoral development might not protect a person from identifying with criminal others, and that law violation could be rationalized regardless of sociomoral level. Gender differences were neither expected nor found. The applied implications of the findings are considered.     

Gender Equality and Reproductive Decision-Making

In Evans, both the U.K. High Court and Court of Appeal upheld Howard Johnstons right to refuse Natallie Evans access to the stored embryos which represented her only hope of having a child which was genetically her own. In this note, I focus on claims of gender (in)equality in the resolution of Evans. My argument is that such claims are often made all too easily, without full consideration of the problems of advancing them in the context of procreative decision-making, where men and women are inevitably differently situated. I conclude that although equality arguments are not wholly without value in this context, they need be used with extreme care. And, with due caution, I set out an equality argument of my own which was not made in Evans.