The Rule of Law and Authoritarian Rule: Legal Politics in Sudan

Mark Fathi, Massoud . 2013 . Law's Fragile State: Colonial, Authoritarian, and Humanitarian Legacies in Sudan . Cambridge University Press. Pp. xxii + 265. $109.99 cloth, $34.99 paper. Does the rule of law guarantee peace and democracy, as so many people in the development and governance field believe? What are the historical and sociocultural conditions that shape the way rule of law mechanisms work in practice? Mark Massoud's monograph tracing the changing dimensions of the rule of law in Sudan from its colonial period to the present offers an important perspective on these questions, casting doubt on the simple argument that the rule of law produces democracy and peace. Instead, he shows how colonial and authoritarian rulers used the rule of law to consolidate power and legitimate their rule. In Law's Fragile State: Colonial, Authoritarian, and Humanitarian Legacies in Sudan, Massoud develops the concept of legal politics, arguing that the way the rule of law works varies with the political system in which it is embedded. He concludes that the forms of legal politics that reinforce the power and authority of legal institutions are more likely to sustain an authoritarian state than to bring democratic rule. His analysis is a valuable caution to those who promote the rule of law as the salvation for all. Taking a sociolegal perspective, he shows how it works in practice.     

Principal-Agency Theory in Illegal Markets: Cooperation and Conflict Among Chinese Loansharks

There are management and organizational problems common to both legal and illegal businesses, such as moving one party to act in the interest of another rather than his own. In principal-agency theory, the party that wants someone else to do a job on his behalf is called the “principal” and the other party is called the “agent”. Principal-agency theory tries to find solutions to real and potential conflicts that arise from such transactional arrangements. We believe principal-agency theory has great potentials for understanding the operation and interpersonal relationships of criminal enterprises, in addition to the structural arrangements (e.g., a disorganized crime market) and the social network perspectives. Using a case study of Chinese loan sharking and cannabis cultivation in the Netherlands, we seek to make a theoretical contribution to existing literature on organized crime by focusing on how different individuals within a criminal enterprise negotiate the most efficient transactional arrangement in a principal-agent relationship amidst the uncertainties of an illicit market environment. We specifically look at four phases of the criminal enterprise studied: the selection of agents by the principal, attempts to bind these agents to the principal, potential conflicts and finally the solution of any problems. Incidentally, our study also gives insight in the less well-researched topic of loansharking.     

Lundquist,Gary (1999). Technology and the Agents of Change

The Journal of Technology Transfer -