The U.S.-Indian Nuclear Agreement: Balancing Energy Needs and Nonproliferation Goals

President Bush and Prime Minister Manmohan Singh of India signed a statement of intent in 2005 to allow India access to civilian nuclear technology, despite its not being a signatory to the Nonproliferation Treaty. This deal would reverse decades of U.S. nonproliferation policy, since India was the source for much of U.S. law on this count. It would require Congress to amend that law to create special exceptions for India. Rationales and critiques of the proposed deal have focused on its impact on the future exercise of U.S. authority on nonproliferation policy worldwide. But the broader impact may be felt internally, since nonproliferation decisions have been inextricably linked to national security imperatives. In acknowledging an economic justification for allowing India access to nuclear energy, the deal has also created a new dependency between U.S. national security policy and the energy profile of emerging powers.     

U.S. Bases and Democratization in Central Asia

Under the Pentagon's current Global Defense Posture Review (GDPR), the United States is reducing its forces in several major Cold War base hosts and establishing a global network of smaller, more flexible facilities in new areas such as Central Asia, the Black Sea and Africa. Drawing upon recent evidence from the Central Asian base hosts of Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan, this article cautions that these new U.S. overseas bases, despite their lighter footprint and regardless of the prevailing security situation, risk becoming enmeshed in the local struggles and political agendas of elites within these hosts. Periods of turbulent democratic transition and regime instability may encourage host country politicians to challenge the legitimacy and terms of the U.S. basing presence for their own political purposes. These are important lessons for U.S. planners who are simultaneously promoting democratization while they negotiate basing and military access agreements in these same politically volatile hosts.     

The Bush Doctrine: The Foreign Policy of Republican Empire

The dominant narrative concerning the Bush Doctrine maintains that it is a dangerous innovation, an anomaly that violates the principles of sound policy as articulated by the Founders. According to the conventional wisdom, the Bush Doctrine represents the exploitation of the 9/11 terrorist attacks, by a small group of ideologues—the “neoconservatives”—to gain control of national policy and lead the United States into the war in Iraq, a war that should never have been fought. But far from a being a neoconservative innovation, the Bush Doctrine is, in fact, well within the mainstream of U.S. foreign policy and very much in keeping with the vision of America's founding generation and the practice of the statesmen in the Early Republic. The Bush Doctrine is only the latest manifestation of the fact that U.S. national interest has always been concerned with more than simple security.     

30 years on - The review of the Council of Europe Data Protection Convention 108

The Council of Europe is engaging in a process of revising its Data Protection Convention (Convention 108) to meet and overcome these challenges. The Council of Europe celebrates this year the 30th Anniversary of its Data Protection Convention (usually referred to as Convention 108) which has served as the backbone of international law in over 40 European countries and has influenced policy and legislation far beyond Europe’s shores. With new data protection challenges arising every day, the Convention is revising its Data Protection Convention. Computer Law and Security Review (CLSR) together with the Intl. Association of IT Lawyers (IAITL) and ILAWS have submitted comments in response to the Expert Committee’s public consultation on this document. CLSR aims to position itself at the forefront of policy discussion drawing upon the high quality scholarly contributions from leading experts around the world.     

The Muslim Middle East: Is There a Democratic Option?

American counterterrorism strategy defines as “moderate” or “mainstream” any Muslim who does not support the jihadi extremists, which sets the bar very low and does not consider the question of how widespread such support actually might be. Unfortunately, Al Qaeda is not the lunatic fringe of Sunni Islam—it is the fanatic core of Sunni Islam, and shares much of its ideology with other organized Islamic groups and, for that matter, much of the Muslim faithful. “Moderate” Islamist groups, such as the Muslim Brotherhood, are moderate only in relative terms, are mostly antidemocratic, and are more correctly considered nonviolent enemies of the U.S. This being the case, a democratic opening in the Muslim Middle East is all too likely to bring to power profoundly antidemocratic groups that are virulently and possibly violently hostile to the U.S. A possible alternative strategy is one stressing good government, with gradual democratization as societies decompress.     

A Smaller Military To Fight the War on Terror

The defense budget can be reduced and the U.S. military downsized because (1) the nation-state threat environment is markedly different than it was during the Cold War, and (2) a large military is not necessary to combat the terrorist threat. In fact, the Islamist terrorist threat is relatively undeterred by the U.S. military presence abroad, and U.S. forces abroad, particularly those deployed in Muslim countries, may do more to exacerbate than to diminish the threat. The arduous task of dismantling and degrading the terrorist network will largely be the task of unprecedented international intelligence and law enforcement cooperation, not the application of large-scale military force. To the extent the military is involved in the war on terror, it will be special forces in discrete operations against specific targets rather than large-scale military operations.     

Stumbling into the Future? The Indirect Approach and American Strategy

The United States has yet to reconcile its strategic culture to the realities of the post-9/11 era. In the absence of a consensus on grand strategy, America's military and civilian leadership is arguing that in a world of “persistent conflict,” America must exercise its power in increasingly indirect ways. This essay explores the current surge of interest in the so-called “indirect approach” and its possible relevance for the strategic environment of today and tomorrow. We briefly consider a strategic framework for an indirect approach, what true implementation would take, and the attendant risks of such a path. Pursuing a global indirect approach in the absence of such a framework could send America stumbling to the farthest corners of the globe only to harm her own strategic interests.