Rational Choice and Dysfunctional Institutions

As stated elsewhere in this issue, we cannot claim to explain an institution's origin just by the functions it serves. In part thismay be because of the cognitive limitations of those actors who are instrumental in institutional formation and institutional change. But even more clearly, it is the case that rational instrumental choice does not imply functional institutions. Just as rational choice in a prisoner's dilemma may result in inefficient policies, rational choice by actors with conflicting preferencesfor institutions may result in institutions that are suboptimal. Examples of rational choice explanations of dysfunctional institutions are provided in the area of bureaucracy, regulation, healthcare, and budgeting. I argue that the paradoxes and impossibility results of rational choice theory offer the best insights currently available into the persistent inefficiencies of the world ofpolitics.     

Effects of storage time on DNA profiling success from archived latent fingerprint samples using an optimised workflow

Due to recent improvements in forensic DNA testing kit sensitivity,there has been an increased demand in the criminal justice community to revisit past convictions or cold cases.Some of these cases have little biological evidence other than touch DNA in the form of archived latent fingerprint lift cards.In this study,a previously developed optimised workflow for this sample type was tested on aged fingerprints to determine if improved short tandem repeat(STR)profiles could be obtained.Two-year-old samples processed with the optimised workflow produced an average of approximately five more STR alleles per profile over the traditional method.The optimised workflow also produced detectable alleles in samples aged out to 28 years.Of the methods tested,the optimised workflow resulted in the most informative profiles from evidence samples more representative of the forensic need.This workflow is recommended for use with archived latent fingerprint samples,regardless of the archival time.     

Empirical Evidence on Human Trafficking and Migration-Debt Contracts in Bangladesh

Abstract

This article presents an analysis of the payments illegal migrants make to traffickers. It covers the total amounts of these payments, the incidence of migration-debt (or shared) contracts, and the value of the deferred payment component under these shared contracts. Data on illegal migrants from three field surveys conducted in Bangladesh from April 2009 to November 2010 are used. The results show that the total payments made to traffickers vary with easily observed characteristics (gender, age, marital status) but do not vary with details of the migration process (training provided, time spent in the trafficker’s queue). These relationships are consistent with exploitation. Migration-debt contracts are more prevalent when the costs of illegal migration are relatively high, which adds empirical support to theoretical models such as Friebel and Guriev (2006). Contrary to existing reports, we document variations in fees for illegal passage across individuals.     

Book reviews: Rewriting Christine

THE BOOK OF THE CITY OF LADIES by Christine de Pizan. Translated by Earl Jeffrey Richards. Persea Books, 1982.

COMIC WOMEN, TRAGIC MEN: A STUDY OF GENDER AND GENRE IN SHAKESPEARE by Linda Bamber. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1982. 211 pp. ($18.50)

THE UNDISCOVERED CONTINENT: EMILY DICKINSON AND THE SPACE OF THE MIND by Suzanne Juhasz. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1983.

REGINA by Leslie Epstein. Coward, McCann and Geoghegan, New York. 251 pp. ($13.95). Avon Books ($3.95).

MORE WORK FOR MOTHER: THE IRONIES OF HOUSEHOLD TECHNOLOGY FROM THE OPEN HEARTH TO THE MICROWAVE by Ruth Schwartz Cowan. Basic Books, New York, 1983. 219 pp.     

The Constrained Instability of Majority Rule: Experiments on the Robustness of the Uncovered Set

Michael S. Lynch Department of Political Science, University of Kansas, 504 Blake Hall, Lawrence, KS 66044 e-mail: mlynch{at}ku.edu Gary J. Miller and Itai Sened Department of Political Science, Washington University in St. Louis, Campus Box 1063, One Brooking Drive, St. Louis, MO 63130 e-mail: gjmiller{at}wustl.edu e-mail: sened{at}wustl.edu (corresponding author) The uncovered set has frequently been proposed as a solutionconcept for majority rule settings. This paper tests this propositionusing a new technique for estimating uncovered sets and a seriesof experiments, including five-player computer-mediated experimentsand 35-player paper-format experiments. The results supportthe theoretic appeal of the uncovered set. Outcomes overwhelminglylie in or near the uncovered set. Furthermore, when preferencesshift, outcomes track the uncovered set. Although outcomes tendto occur within the uncovered set, they are not necessarilystable; majority dominance relationships still produce instability,albeit constrained by the uncovered set. Authors' note: We thank Matthew M. Schneider for research assistance.We thank James Holloway, Tse-Min Lin, Jim Granato, Randall L.Calvert, Rick K. Wilson, faculty and students of the Juan MarchInstitute, and reviewers of Political Analysis for their veryhelpful comments and suggestions.     

Pop Goes IR? Researching the Popular Culture–World Politics Continuum

In this article we offer a potential research agenda for the study of popular culture in IR and outline how this research agenda could be advanced. If the incorporation of popular culture into IR is going to be fruitful, there must be a willingness to go beyond an engagement with illustrations of world politics. Doing so will get us closer to what is at stake in the mutual implication of popular culture and world politics.