Trajectory Classes of Relational and Physical Bullying Victimization: Links with Peer and Teacher-Student Relationships and Social-Emotional Outcomes

Journal of Youth and Adolescence - Bullying victimization is a prevalent problem in upper elementary school that predicts various detrimental outcomes. Increasing evidence suggests that...     

Populist Radical Right Parties in the Nordic Region: A New and Distinct Party Family?

The Nordic countries are no longer characterized by a stable five‐party system. Not only have small Christian parties and Green parties emerged in most countries, so‐called ‘populist radical right parties’ have also been increasingly successful in recent decades. This article examines to what extent the populist radical right parties in the Nordic countries represent a new party family. Based on various and original data, including archive material, interviews with key representatives, party manifestos and expert surveys, the processes of deciding party names, the development of transnational linkages and ideological transformation are analyzed. The article demonstrates that even though the Danish People's Party, the True Finns and the Sweden Democrats have different historical legacies, they have converged ideologically (i.e., socioeconomically centrist and socioculturally authoritarian), adopted similar names and are on the verge of becoming a more formalized transnational actor. The Progress Party in Norway is better seen as a hybrid between a populist radical right party and a more traditional conservative party. The findings challenge several classifications in the extensive literature on populist radical right parties. Most importantly, the True Finns should be included as a populist radical right party, whereas the Norwegian party should be treated more carefully. Furthermore, Nordic populist radical right parties are no longer – if they have ever been – so‐called ‘neoliberal populists’. Finally, the findings suggest a re‐freezing of the Nordic party systems in which a phase of divergence has been replaced by a phase of convergence.     

Democratic Oversight in Fragile States: The Case of Intelligence Reform in Bosnia and Herzegovina

In most transition countries the main aim of ‘democratizing intelligence’ is to weaken the authoritarian governmental structures by introducing more transparency, legality and oversight. In Bosnia and Herzegovina however, the state-building efforts driven by international parties combined formal democratization processes such as independent oversight with the strengthening and operational capacity building of previously weak-to-non-existent intelligence structures. In parallel with the descent into war when Yugoslavia collapsed in the early 1990s, the State Security Service (SDB) in the Republic of Bosnia had split into three ethnically-based outfits answering to the political and military leaders of war. ‘Democratization’ of intelligence in Bosnia and Herzegovina since the establishment of a unified, state-level Intelligence and Security Agency (OSA) in 2004 has followed its own unique path reflecting the fragmented nature of politics in Bosnia and the leading role of international organizations in proposing and effectuating institutional reforms. Nevertheless, in terms of habits, operational methods and values many Bosnian intelligence officers went through similar adaptations and transitions as their colleagues in countries where institutions at the time of democratic transition were too strong and authoritarian rather than, as in the case of Bosnia, being deemed too weak and ineffectual.     

Blame attribution and guilt feelings in violent offenders

Offenders with high psychopathic traits and/or antisocial personality disorder (ASPD) are hypothesised to experience less guilt and less responsibility for their actions than offenders without these problems. These hypotheses were tested and partly substantiated. The study investigates blame attributions and guilt feeling using Gudjonsson Blame Attribution Inventory–Revised (GBAI-R) for 177 young male violent offenders. GBAI scores were compared to ASPD and psychopathy according to the Psychopathy Checklist–Revised. Results showed that individuals with ASPD and those with higher degrees of psychopathy tended to report significantly less guilt and higher degree of mental control than other subjects. Another finding was a weak relationship between ASPD, high scores on psychopathic traits and external attribution. We suggest these results might be explained by admitting poor mental control may be extra difficult for individuals belonging to either of these groups and that the external attribution items do not separate causal from moral responsibility.     

Does the IMF cause civil war? A comment

The global economic downturn has heightened concerns about intervention by global financial institutions and political stability. One prominently-published article purports to show that signing on to an IMF structural adjustment program (SAP) increases the risk of civil war, Hartzell et al. (International Organization 64:339–56, 2010). The authors claim that IMF SAPs push liberalization, which hurts people badly enough that they foment civil war. We advance the debate by critically examining their theoretical and empirical evidence, particularly questioning their crucial assumptions about the impact of IMF programs on the economic environment in terms of who actually wins and loses from liberalization and who might be in a position to rebel. Using their data, we find that signing on to an IMF program predicts the onset of a civil war negatively if one uses a lower threshold of 25 deaths when defining civil war. These results suggest that the operationalization of the IMF variable as well as the use of large-scale civil war (1,000 deaths and above) simply capture the effect of ongoing conflict rather than the effects of liberalization. After extending the time period under study and making only minor changes to operationalization, we find that at no time does IMF involvement successfully predict the onset of a civil war.     

China Investment Corporation’s Forays into Europe and the United States: explaining the different receptions

This study analyses the changing investment climates for China’s sovereign wealth fund, the China Investment Corporation (CIC), in the US, the UK and France. It assesses legislative flexibilities, public opinions and macroeconomic conditions in the three polities in order to ascertain whether the investment review process of each is susceptible to politicization, and if such susceptibility has changed in line with macroeconomic variations. The study finds that the US investment review process is susceptible to politicization and that such politicization has likely taken place following the recovery from the global financial crisis, resulting in a worsened investment climate for Chinese investors, including CIC. The investment review processes in the UK and France have not been susceptible to politicization. Moreover, negative macroeconomic conditions for each of the two countries following the eruption of the Eurozone crisis have resulted in an improved investment climate for CIC, although brought about by the proactive stance of governments and companies rather than by any de-politicization.     

The perils of ‘going local’: liberal peace-building agendas in Nepal

Responding to recent critiques, foreign aid organisations are increasingly ‘going local’ in their operations in order to integrate local actors into their peace-building and aid projects. This is done under the belief that entering into partnerships directly with grassroots actors will increase local autonomy in joint ventures, thus empowering locals as agents of change both during and after the project period. But despite its normative and conceptual appeal, we argue that this model is not workable in practice and cannot be under the current structural conditions of the international aid environment. This is due to a fundamental disconnect between the conceptualisation and rationale of ‘going local’ and the structural and institutional frameworks within which ‘local ownership’ is supposed to be operationalised and implemented. This paper uses the example of Nepal to illustrate that this disconnect not only prevents foreign aid organisations from reaching their stated goals, but exacerbates the very problems that ‘going local’ is supposed to address.     

In the light of equity and science: scientific expertise and climate justice after Paris

The Paris Agreement is built on a tension between the common goal of limiting warming to 1.5 °C and the differentiation that follows from the principle of equity. Scientific expertise is commonly seen as providing important means to overcome this tension, for example in the Agreement’s “global stocktake”, which is said to be undertaken “in the light of equity and the best available science”. This raises the question of how scholarly communities best can contribute to deliberations on equitable differentiation in the effort required to meet common temperature goals. To discuss this question, the paper looks to the literature within Science and Technology Studies on the role of science in policymaking, where disagreement exists over the merits of “heating up” controversies through politicization, versus “cooling down” issues by seeking consensus. It assesses two cases in which scientific expertise has engaged with questions of equitable effort-sharing in international climate politics: The “Bali Box” of the IPCC’s Fourth Assessment Report, and the “Civil Society Equity Review” undertaken prior to COP21 in Paris. Based on a comparison of the two cases, it is argued that scientific contributions should not shy away from highlighting conflicts in values and interests, and that “heating up” discussions about climate justice may be a valuable contribution to overcoming the tensions of the Paris Agreement.     

Recidivism is related to psychopathy (PCL-R) in a group of men convicted of homicide

It is well known that psychopaths are a group with high risk for criminality. Despite that, researchers and clinicians have not yet agreed on a general cause of psychopathy. However Raine [Raine, A. (2002). Biosocial studies of antisocial and violent behavior in children and adults: A review. Journal of Abnormal Child Psychology, 30, 311-326.] advocated a biosocial model of violent behaviour where the greatest risk for criminal behaviour occurred when both heredity and environmental risk factors (e.g., social class, childhood history) were present. In this follow-up study, 35 men convicted of homicide were assessed retrospectively for psychopathy according to the Psychopathy Checklist-Revised (PCL-R). Information on personal history, as well as from legal documents and records of offences committed by the subjects was also obtained. Fourteen of the 35 men were classified as psychopaths. Two men, both rated as psychopaths, had criminal parents. Twenty-seven of the men had a social relationship with their victim, and eleven out of these were rated as psychopaths. There was no difference in PCL-R scores between those who had a social relationship with their victim and those who did not. The psychopaths relapsed more frequently than the nonpsychopaths into criminality after their prison term. This result confirms previous research indicating that psychopathy is a risk factor for recidivism. It is, therefore, very important that psychopaths get the best possible treatment, aftercare, and supervision.