Models for commercialization of technology from universities and research laboratories

One of the most admired aspects of U.S. technology has been the ability to assimilate and commercialize new science and technology. In light of the rising international competition, there has been new emphasis placed on the commercialization of U.S. science and technology developed in the federal laboratories. While research and development remains the focus of these laboratories, passage of the Stevenson-Wydler Technology Act of 1980 and the Technology Transfer Act of 1986 has resulted in a means to further the exploitation of discoveries, patents, and copyrights developed within the laboratories. The transfer of technology to industrial partners and users is a complex task for a federal laboratory. Since the interaction with industry, as well as market knowledge and assessment of the needs of business users are beyond the charter of a federal laboratory, new organizational mechanisms are required in order to obtain full commercial value from the laboratories' efforts. A study was instituted to examine selected organizational and policy arrangements for achieving the optimum commercial value from the science and technology research at the research and development laboratories sponsored and funded by the U.S. government.     

The impact of constitutional structures and collective and competitive veto points on income inequality in industrialized democracies

Abstract This paper presents the first systematic, empirical examination of the impact of constitutional structures on income inequality among eighteen OECD countries. Our pooled time series/cross–sectional panel analysis (n = 18, t = 2) reveals that consensual political institutions are systematically related to lower income inequalities while the reverse is true for majoritarian political institutions. We also make a crucial distinction between 'collective' and 'competitive' veto points. Our multiple regression results provide strong evidence that collective veto points depress income inequalities while competitive veto points tend to widen the inequality of incomes. Thus, some institutional veto points have constraining effects on policy while others have 'enabling' effects.     

Gunshot residue particle velocity and deceleration

The velocity of over 800 gunshot residue particles from eight different sources was determined using high speed stroboscopic photography (spark gap light source). These particles were found to have an average velocity of 500 to 600 ft per second. Many particles acquired considerably higher velocities. Thus, the particles have sufficient energy to embed themselves within certain nearby targets like skin or fabric. The relatively high velocity that the particles acquire explain the formation of stippling on skin in close proximity to a muzzle discharge. These findings also indicate little influence of air currents on particle behavior near the muzzle. The deceleration of less than 100 particles during a 100-microsecond interval was also calculated. The particles experienced rapid rates of deceleration which would explain why few particles are found in test firings beyond 3 ft from the muzzle of a discharged firearm. Because of their relatively high velocity, normal wind velocity would not be expected to significantly influence their motion near the muzzle.