Keeping promises: A systematic review and a new classification of gang control strategies

Purpose

We argue that inadequate frameworks to compare similar gang control strategies, and the scarcity of well-designed evaluations have hindered our ability to determine the effectiveness of existing programs. This article proposes a new typology of gang control strategies to use with logic models as tools to improve gang program evaluation.

Methods

We conducted a systematic review of gang control strategy evaluation reports and created a typology from the studies identified. Studies were selected on the basis of methodological quality in order to reflect only rigorous evaluations with credible research findings.

Results

Forty-five studies were selected and reviewed. Studies were classified in homogeneous categories based on the targeted population and the objective of the strategy. We infer logic models that consider the activities, outputs, and outcomes of each type of strategy.

Conclusion

A better framework for the comparison of similar studies may allow meta-analyses to be conducted, thereby improving our knowledge of what works. Logic models can move the field forward by allowing researchers to understand why some programs work and others do not. The improvement, both in quality and quantity, of program evaluation in gang research is crucial in order to move beyond claims of promising approaches.     

Towards a More Comprehensive Analysis of Warlord Politics: Constitutive Agency,Patron–Client Networks and Robust Action

This article serves as a critique of a recent American foreign policy formulation proposing to eradicate ‘warlordism’ and asserting that democratic institutions can be directly created out of the post-eradication anarchic chaos. Against this background, recent years have indeed seen a bourgeoning literature on ‘warlord politics’ in Southeast Asia. The majority commonly portray political actors as faithful followers of economic rationality and self-interest. Therefore, most are conceived as selfish predators who ruthlessly use violence for private gains at the expense of public interest. By suggesting that comparative studies on warlordism have been heavily influenced by the political economy perspective, the article develops a more comprehensive analysis of warlord politics. Along the lines of patron–client network analysis, insights from moral economy and agency-structure sociological dualism are considered. Contrasting case studies are used to illustrate how the alleged warlords of Southeast Asia do not fit entirely into the political economy perspective. Caught in a vast patron–client network of competing interests and diverse powers across state and society, one's agency is constantly constituted by discursive arrays of contending interests, juxtaposing rationalities and multiple intentions. In state building, this complication is regarded as paradoxically necessary for compelling the alleged warlord-actor to re-define and elevate multiple private interests into public interest.     

Malaysia – towards a topology of an electoral one-party state

For the first time in 51 years of independence, Malaysia's ruling coalition Barisan Nasional (National Front, BN) under the weak leadership of Abdullah Badawi was denied its customary parliamentary two-third majority in the 2008 elections. The three major opposition parties, which formed the Pakatan Rakyat (The People's Alliance, PR) after the elections, increased the number of opposition-held state governments from one to five. The opposition had never held more than two state governments at any one time.1 Chin and Wong, ‘Malaysia's Electoral Upheaval’. Parts of this paper were used in a research project organized by the Malaysian Strategic Research Centre. View all notes For many practitioners and students of Malaysian politics, the 2008 poll means the birth of a long overdue ‘two-party system’, where two multi-ethnic coalitions contest for power and alternate in running the country. After all, two similar attempts to build a Malay-dominated second coalition to rival the ruling coalition dominated by the ethno-nationalist United Malays National Organisation (UMNO) were made in the 1990 and 1999 elections by former UMNO leaders who lost in their party in-fighting. Sadly, the coalitions built did not survive even the next elections. We argue that such optimism may be misplaced due to a failure to appreciate the ‘electoral one-party state’ nature of Malaysia.2 Wong and Norani, ‘Malaysia at 50’. View all notes Despite having held 13 national elections without failure, and having almost no incidence of in- or post-election violence, neither a military coup nor ‘people's power’, Malaysia has never been anywhere close to being a ‘consolidated democracy’, 52 years after joining what Huntington called the second wave of democratization.3 Huntington, The Third Wave. View all notes For Linz and Stepan, a consolidated democracy requires not only a government with de facto authority to generate policy and exclusive de jure power, but also that ‘this government comes to power that is the direct result of a free and popular vote’. In other words, democracy has to become ‘the only game in town’.4 Linz and Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition, 5. View all notes     

Fiscal policy and the development of green transportation infrastructure: the case of China's high-speed railways

Economic Change and Restructuring - High-speed rail (HSR) has been highly valued as an accelerator of green economic growth. However, the difficulty in financing caused by the high investment...     

The Association between Intimate Partner Violence and Functional Gastrointestinal Disorders and Symptoms among Adult Women: Systematic Review

Journal of Family Violence - Functional gastrointestinal disorders (FGIDs) and symptoms have been identified as possible health consequences of intimate partner violence (IPV). However, whether...     

The Third Sector and Residential Care for the Elderly in China's Transitional Welfare Economy

This article examines third‐sector welfare homes for Chinese elderly and argues that four factors affect their survival and development prospects: the extent care establishments meet the needs of their users; how successfully they manage their human resources; whether they ensure their financial sustainability; and whether they satisfy the expectations of their investors. The data reveal that while care homes generally serve their customers well and maintain staff satisfaction, they encounter difficulties in financing and service operation that pose grave challenges to their investors. The resulting problems cast a shadow over the future prospects of old‐age care homes and raise questions concerning the state's non‐profit policy.