Bundled Discounts, Leverage Theory, and Downstream Competition

Under plausible circumstances, a monopolist in one market canuse its control of prices in that market to force competingdownstream buyers to sign tying contracts that will lever itsmonopoly into another market. Specifically, the monopolist ofthe tying good can place each downstream buyer in a prisoner'sdilemma by offering them more favorable pricing on the tyinggood if they sign a requirements-tying contract covering thetied good. Since a buyer benefits on receiving more favorablepricing on the tying good and the competitors do not, and suffersif the competitors receive more favorable pricing on the tyinggood and the buyer does not, buyers will sign the tying contracteven when they would earn higher profits if they all refusedto sign. This enables a monopolist in one market to inefficientlyexclude an entrant in another market.     

Death following injection sclerotherapy due to phenol toxicity

Prolapse rectum (PR) or protrusion of the rectum beyond the anus occurs frequently in populations at both extremes of age. In the pediatric population, in developed countries, the commonest cause for PR is thought to be cystic fibrosis (CF). Treatment options for CF include conservative management, surgical resection and fixation, suturing, and injection sclerotherapy (IS). The last is considered an attractive treatment option because it is minimally invasive. In this case report, the authors present the details about a 2-year-old female child, with PR and CF, who died after IS, using phenol as the sclerotherapeutic agent. Autopsy findings and toxicology tests performed to establish phenol toxicity are documented. The available literature is reviewed. This case report underscores the risks of using phenol for IS and emphasizes the point that the procedure is not innocuous and an adverse outcome including fatality is a possibility.     

The creation of neo-liberal corporate bias in transnational medicines control: The industrial shaping and interest dynamics of the European regulatory state

Abstract. Drawing on the political theories of corporatism, neo–liberalism and pluralism, and on comparative empirical research in Brussels, Germany, Sweden and the UK, this article conceptualises the nature of Europeanised medicines regulation. It argues that a marketisation of regulation has been established in the European Union as a result of competition between national regulatory agencies for 'regulatory business' from the pharmaceutical industry. In the pharmaceuticals sector the Europeanised regulatory state is a product of three key factors: (a) the European Commission's commitment to an 'efficiency' regime which would meet the political objectives of a single European market and the commercial agendas of transnational pharmaceutical companies, (b) the endemic corporate bias associated with medicines regulation in the most influential member states, and (c) the considerable success of neo–liberal politics across a number of major member states, including Germany, Sweden and the United Kingdom.