Social position,ideology, and distributive justice

This paper addresses two important questions regarding distributive justice. First we ask whether people use standards or principles of distributive justice regarding the allocation of income. The study confirms our expectation that there are at least two principles, viz., the merit and the need principle. Our data show that there is no generally held consensus about the applicability of these two principles. Second, we looked for explanations to explain variations in adherence to these principles. The literature suggests five different theses: 1. self-interest; 2. ideology; 3. enlightenment; 4. historical shift; and 5. gender. Results provide qualified support for the Theses 1, 2 and 4. Class, ideology, and age affect the preferences for the principles of justice. Further elaboration suggests the data point to a specific version of the self-interest thesis, viz., the underdog thesis. Theses 3 and 5 are not confirmed. Implications of these findings are discussed.     

Parallel informal negotiation: A new kind of international dialogue

Bargaining in the international arena is intrinsically positional. Negotiators are often instructed by their governments not to improvise or explore new options when they meet with their counterparts — even though the invention of additional tradeoffs or packages might well produce better results for all sides. This article describes an approach that we call parallel informal negotiation which encourages a collaborative effort between contending groups that were officially not even allowed to interact: international trade and environment policy makers.     

Compliance without enforcement: State behavior under regulatory treaties

Conclusion The common conception is that treaties are not complied with because they are unenforceable, and that the cure for this condition is treaties with teeth. Our study shows that there are good reasons why states resist formal enforcement measures in treaties and are likely to continue to do so.On the other hand, negotiation, which is the principal method for dealing with compliance problems, has had a significant measure of success. This should not surprise us. Negotiation often produces agreements between parties who are not bound to agree to anything. In the context of a set of treaty norms accepted by the parties and acknowledged as having binding force, bargaining takes place in the shadow of the law as surely as when there is a possibility of ultimate recourse to coercive sanctions.In this article, we suggest some approaches that appear to enhance the effectiveness of this process. Some have close links to general negotiating theory, such as the importance of transparency between the parties and the need for careful attention to the possibilities for non-binding third party involvement. Others are more closely related to the structural features of national and international decision-making. It remains to elaborate on these themes and integrate them with others in a comprehensive account of how and why states comply with treaties. Abram Chayes is the Felix Frankfurter Professor of Law at Harvard Law School, Cambridge, Mass. 02138.Antonia Handler Chayes is a principal in Endispute Inc., 955 Massachusetts Ave., Cambridge, Mass. 02139. Abram and Antonia Chayes are co-directors of the Project on International Compliance and Dispute Settlement, a research project based at the Program on Negotiation at Harvard Law School.