Unity and conflict: Explaining financial industry lobbying success in European Union public consultations

This article examines the contingent nature of financial industry lobbying power in the context of the policy formation stage of six European Commission regulatory proposals. I argue that lobbying success is a function of how well finance is able to speak with a unified voice. Building on existing studies, I examine industry unity as explicit preference alignment between actors but also in terms of actors abstaining from stating preferences. Staying silent on an issue sends signals to policymakers about issue saliency and industry support. Using a novel dataset derived from document coding and interviews, I examine the impact of industry unity on lobbying success in shaping six financial regulatory proposals in the context of the European Union. My findings show that lobbying success is partially contingent on the extent to which finance is united behind a common position. Critically, however, lobbying success is also related to the nature of that position, whether supporting the proposal or whether in favor of strengthening or weakening regulatory stringency.     

The Influence of Established Ideas in Emerging Development Organisations: Gender Equality and the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation

This article explores how ideas and practices may find their way into and entail significant changes in organisations as these enter into new fields and are increasingly confronted with dominant normative frameworks. Drawing on sociological institutional perspectives, I conceptualise three analytical processes occurring as ideas find their way into development organisations: i) emergence; ii) international negotiation and consensus production; and iii) external negotiation and appropriation. I then empirically explore these processes through a case study of how ideas and practices on gender equality and women’s empowerment have entered into and been made workable in the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation.     

Comparing Central City Finances Using Fiscally Standardized Cities

Abstract

Because fiscal institutions and arrangements differ widely across US cities, it has until now been very difficult to conduct comparative analysis of spending, revenues, and debt in US cities. This paper describes a new city fiscal dataset, called fiscally standardized cities (FiSCs), that directly addresses the varying roles of municipal governments, counties, school districts, and special districts in the financing of central cities. By taking systematic account of fiscal data for all the major units of government in large cities over a long time period (1977–2012), the FiSC data permit investigation of a wide range of important comparative policy issues for cities. The article describes the methodology used to construct FiSCs, and gives a number of examples to illustrate the potential uses of the FiSC data. For example, it shows how spending comparisons between cities can be fundamentally misleading unless account is taken of the varying roles of overlapping governmental units. It also demonstrates how the FiSC data can be used to benchmark fiscal data for one city against comparable cities.     

Democracy as an equilibrium

Observation shows that while democracy is fragile in poor countries, it is impregnable in developed ones. To explain this pattern, I develop a model in which political parties propose redistributions of incomes, observe the result of an election, and decide whether to comply with the outcome or to launch a struggle for dictatorship. Democracy prevails in developed societies because too much is at stake in turning against it. More income can be redistributed in developed than in poor countries without threatening democracy. Limits on redistribution arise endogenously, so that constitutions are not necessary for democracy to endure. A democratic culture characterizes the equilibrium.     

Pollution,Politics, and Preferences for Environmental Spending in the States

While state environmental and natural resource spending is designed to address actual environmental problems, the budget process is also inherently political. Thus, in the following article we ask a simple question: to what extent does state environmental and natural resource spending respond to the scope of environmental problems in a state, versus the demands of the political process? Unlike the bulk of previous research, we consider both aggregate spending and program‐specific spending. We also consider how the severity of environmental problems and the political environment may interact to determine spending. The findings show that politics, specifically the strength of the environmental movement, is a more important determinant of state environmental spending than pollution severity. However, for some program areas, it appears that strong environmental groups make state budgets more responsive to the severity of environmental problems.     

ELECTRONIC COMMERCE — CLICK-WRAP AGREEMENTS: THE ENFORCEABILITY OF CLICK-WRAP AGREEMENTS

This article examines the practical issues surrounding the use and enforceability of click-wrap agreements and presents preliminary findings of basic research to determine consumer awareness, understanding and attitudes to such agreements.