Suicide with multiple graze shots

A 77-year-old man was found in his flat with a shot to the right temple. In spite of hospital treatment he died from the head injury the next day. The weapon at the scene used for committing the suicide was a pistol, make Kaba Special (calibre 6.35 mm). At autopsy, the right temporal region showed a surgically treated, originally stellate gunshot entrance wound with a powder cavity. Close to this penetrating gunshot wound there were 3 parallel graze shot injuries of the scalp. The autopsy findings were consistent with the assumption that all the shots had been fired by the victim himself with suicidal intent. The injury pattern is presented and discussed in relation to the results of the technical investigation of the weapon and the findings at the scene.     

The role of moral disengagement in the execution process

The present study tested the proposition that disengagement of moral self-sanctions enables prison personnel to carry out the death penalty. Three subgroups of personnel in penitentiaries located in three Southern states were assessed in terms of eight mechanisms of moral disengagement. The personnel included the execution teams that carry out the executions; the support teams that provide solace and emotional support to the families of the victims and the condemned inmate; and prison guards who have no involvement in the execution process. The executioners exhibited the highest level of moral, social, and economic justifications, disavowal of personal responsibility, and dehumanization. The support teams that provide the more humane services disavowed moral disengagement, as did the noninvolved guards but to a lesser degree than the support teams.     

Successor Liability and Asymmetric Information

The doctrine of successor liability transfers tort liabilityarising from the seller's past conduct from the seller to thebuyer. If the buyer has as much information about the liabilityas the seller, all beneficial acquisitions take place and theseller takes the efficient level of precaution. However, ifthe seller has more information about the liability than thebuyer, not all beneficial acquisitions are consummated and theseller takes a suboptimal level of precaution. I argue that,in the presence of information asymmetry, the courts shouldincrease the damages against the (potential) seller to providebetter incentives to take precaution while decreasing the damagesagainst the buyer to encourage more beneficial asset sales.