How to solve the many-state problem: a reply to the debate

This article responds to the debate provoked by the author's ‘Does capitalism need the state system?’ (Cambridge Review of International Affairs, 20:4 2007, 533–549) and his exchanges with Justin Rosenberg (Cambridge Review of International Affairs, 21:1 2008, 77–112). It is divided into three parts. The first restates the issues, situating them in the context of a growing Marxist preoccupation with the international in recent years, and contrasts the ‘high road’—Rosenberg's attempt to use Trotsky's concept of uneven and combined development to provide a transhistorical perspective on intersocietal relations—with Callinicos's own preferred ‘low road’ of more focused analysis centred on the prevailing mode(s) of production. The second addresses the fundamental criticisms addressed to him by Hannes Lacher, Benno Teschke and John M Hobson, all of whom deny that there is a necessary relation between capitalism and the interstate system. The third considers the more specific comments offered by Neil Davidson, Gonso Pozo-Martin, and Jamie Allinson and Alex Anievas, before concluding with an appeal for a move off the terrain of abstract theory to more empirical studies that can test the relative value of rival conceptual constructions.     

And justice for all? Investigators’ perceptions of punishment for fraud perpetrators

Despite extensive financial losses and other indicators of harm, the American public and legal professionals have historically been ambivalent toward white-collar crime. Recent research demonstrates that public perceptions of white-collar crime and attitudes toward the punishment of white-collar offenders have become more punitive. Along these lines, a neglected area of research concerns those individuals who routinely face white-collar crimes: fraud investigators. Using data collected during the height of recent corporate scandals (2001–02), this study examines the perceptions of 663 fraud investigators and extends prior research by considering the influence of investigator characteristics, organizational context (i.e., size, setting, internal controls, and resource capacity), case characteristics (i.e., offense type, financial loss, and sanction), and offender characteristics on legal professionals’ general and specific punishment perceptions. Results indicate that organizational resources increase the likelihood of both outcomes. Additionally, the correlates of general and specific punishment perceptions are found to differ: government agency context influences general but not specific perceptions. Comparatively, the perception that fraud is increasing and a sanction that includes incarceration each have a significant, positive influence on specific punishment perceptions. Implications of these findings for future research and policy are discussed.

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Modeling the Deviant Y in Criminology: An Examination of the Assumptions of Censored Normal Regression and Potential Alternatives

Many dependent variables of criminological interest have censored distributions. Investigations that use such variables increasingly have turned to the Tobit model, a censored regression technique that is specified based on a latent dependent variable. When used under suitable circumstances, this model provides appropriate estimates. This paper discusses key assumptions of the Tobit model. It then highlights the risk of violating these assumptions and reviews alternative flexible parametric and semiparametric modeling techniques, currently used sparingly in criminology, which researchers may find helpful when assumptions regarding the error terms are untenable. By using an empirical example focused on sentencing outcomes and comparing estimates across analytic methods, this study illustrates the potential utility of simultaneously estimating the Tobit model along with some alternatives.

The Curious Attraction of Wagner's Law

Wagner's ‘law of increasing state activity’ has recently been subjected to intensive use of recondite econometric testing procedures. An examination of the relevant articles reveals ignorance both of Wagner's definition of ‘state activity’ and of his insistence that he was not engaged in prediction. Consequently, the omission of public enterprises contained in Wagner's definition leads to a model misspecification and the object of testing his hypothesiss remains obscure.     

Studying the reach of deterrence: Can deterrence theory help explain police misconduct?

This article reports the first perceptual deterrence study of a sample of police officers. The study investigated the influence of traditional deterrence considerations, extralegal sanctions, and impulsivity on the intention to commit several hypothesized acts of police misconduct. The results were largely consistent with perceptual deterrence findings from samples of college students, experienced offenders, and corporate managers. In particular, this study found that both legal and extralegal sanction threats potentially deter police misconduct. Further, it found that impulsivity diminished the deterrent influence of both sanction forms. The study also found that some of the effects of the explanatory variables depended on whether officers had prior punishment experience. The article discusses the implications of its findings for combating police misconduct and for deterrence research generally.     

Theoretical issues and social indicators: A societal process approach

Well-being involves various levels: the individual, the institutional-distributive, and the societal. These levels are interrelated. Social indicators of well-being must be theoretically based so as to take into account these levels. A societal process model is proposed to describe the levels of society and the nature of well-being at each level. Social indicator types regarding the output and distribution of well-being, the effect of policy manipulatable and nonmanipulatable inputs, and the secondary consequences of inputs are suggested and examples are provided.The ideas presented herein have evolved from the authors' participation in a research project conducted for the U.S. Agency for International Development (AID/csd—3642), but do not necessarily reflect the views of that agency. Thanks are extended to J. Steven Picou, James Copp, Jon Alston, Bill Howard, and Ben Crouch, as well as to the then editor of this journal, Garry Brewer, and several anonymous reviewers who were kind enough to provide both cogent critique and encouragement. Journal Paper No. J-8808 of the Iowa Agriculture and Home Economics Experiment station, Ames, Iowa. Project No. 1837.