The analysis and comparison of blue wool fibre populations found at random on clothing.

Fifty-eight garments were taped and searched for mid to dark blue wool fibres. These were then removed from the tapings, mounted on slides and examined using a high-power microscope (400x). A total of 2,740 blue wool fibres were identified and visible range microspectrophotometry (MSP) was performed on them. Three hundred independent blue wool populations were identified on 56 of the 58 garments searched. The lack of control fibres meant the spectral range of each population was unknown. The number of populations may have been underestimated by grouping together the fibres that had broad single peaks and a lack of distinguishing features in the spectra. Although blue wool is considered to be a common fibre type, 300 unique spectral shapes were identified by the use of microspectrophotometry alone. This demonstrates that the dyes used in the dyeing of blue wool are variable. Showing that many different populations of blue wool occur on a range of garments should ensure that the forensic scientist does not underestimate or understate the strength of evidence in cases where blue wool is found. Hopefully this work will enlighten scientists and enable them to also assess the true value of their findings when other commonly occurring fibres are encountered.     

Theoretical foundation for a debtor friendly bankruptcy law in favour of creditors

Although many works support creditor friendly bankruptcy laws, an evolution towards debtor friendly systems is at work. This paper proposes a theoretical ground to meet this paradox. It reconsiders the economic role of bankruptcy law by stressing on the courts’ production of information. It reveals that the transmission of a lenient signal by judges makes it possible to reduce the hazard that bad risks seek to avoid going on trial. Thus, it shows that debtor friendly bankruptcy laws are not systematically opposed to creditors’ interests. They reduce the risk of the economy and contribute to the improvement of the global efficiency.      

The product paradox of voting power

We consider a system made up of two committees, with overlapping membership but with different rules for passing decisions; the passage of a joint resolution requires separate approval by each committee. We show that it is possible for one voter a to be stronger (have greater voting power) than another voter b in both of the two committees, while in the two-committee system (considered as a single composite entity) b is stronger than a. We argue that this apparently paradoxical phenomenon is inherent in the structure of the decision-making system in question, rather than being an artefact of any particular index used to measure voting power.