A European “Equivalent” to United States Export Controls: European Law on the Control of International Trade in Dual-Use Space Technologies

This article analyzes the system developed within Europe, more precisely within the European Union through European Community law, to address the security-sensitive issues involved in the export of hardware, software, and knowledge for the purpose of space activities and major space applications. The subject is introduced with reference to the far better known export control developments within the United States, such as those concerning International Traffic in Arms Regulations, and the international understandings under the Missile Technology Control Regime and Wassenaar Arrangement. European Community Regulations for export controls provide for a complex system of balances between national sovereignty and Europe-wide harmonization. This European Community regime, though ultimately still dependent upon individual state's sovereign controls, establishes an interesting measure of international harmonization in security-sensitive export controls. Although the European Community regime is fraught with many complexities, it manages to avoid some of the pitfalls evident in the United States and international regimes, notably the confusing discussions on discerning weaponry proper from other space items with dual-use potential. This is the result mainly of an approach characterized by a primary intention to harmonize, rather than to apply strict controls per se, resulting in a transparency and consistency that are not only valuable to commercial entrepreneurs, but also to those concerned primarily with the security risks posed by the international space industry. As for the space industry in particular, it is helpful that the European Community regime specifically carves out civil space activities, for example if conducted within the context of the European Space Agency or national space agency activities.     

Are Service Profiles Incubator-Specific? Results from an Empirical Investigation in Italy*

What are the core services of start-up incubators, and how can the be managed best? We use five incubator archetypes (university, regional business, company-internal, independent commercial, and virtual incubators) to identify key services and describe their implementation. Case-research was conducted on 10 incubators (from an estimated total of 50) in Italy. We concluded that differences in competitive scope (industry, geography, and segment focus) and differences in strategic objectives (profit versus non-for-profit) influence the nature, quality and implementation of incubation services and the way they are managed.     

Licences in OHIM practice

Legal context: Despite the commercial importance of licences, the Regulation40/94 contains relatively few provisions on licences. As faras these refer to licences granted to CTMs or their recordalat OHIM, they are beyond the scope of the article, which dealswith the case law emanating from OHIM in inter partes proceedings,where licences have played a role. Key points: This article considers the legal requirements licensees mustmeet when filing opposition and cancellation proceedings beforeOHIM. It reviews when use under licence is regarded as genuineuse, or valid for the purpose of establishing acquired distinctivenessor reputation. It also deals with OHIM decisions regarding licenseesfiling the licensors' trade marks in their own names. Practical significance: With respect to the standing of licensees as opponents or applicantsfor invalidity, this article explains the procedural requirements,mentioning also points to be considered when drafting trademark licences. The article also explains to what extent a licenceneed be proven where the opponent or cancellation applicanthas not used the earlier mark himself but wishes to rely onuse made by someone else. On the issue of a licensee filingthe licensed mark in his own name, the article gives an introductionto the criteria applied by OHIM and deals with his fiduciaryposition, resulting in a greater likelihood of his having actedin bad faith.     

Back‐pedalling in Iraq: lessons unlearned

This article analyses which of the major lessons learned from previous experiences in nation building have been applied or ignored in Iraq. It focuses on the first six months of the post‐combat period, a time frame generally recognised as being critical for laying the foundations for a stable and democratic future. A review of previous cases points to six lessons that, in fact, have been unlearned, and only two that have been realised in this initial phase in Iraq.     

Mortgage fraud and organized crime in Canada: strategic intelligence brief

Natasha Tusikov, Acting Manager, National Research and Methodology Development Unit, Criminal Intelligence Service Canada - Central Bureau, Intelligence Analysis and Knowledge Development Branch, November 2007