Nigerian Constitutional Proposals

Proposals for drastic constitutional reform in Nigeria wereissued at the beginning of March in the form of a white paper(Cmd. 6599, price 3d.) combining a historical introduction drawnup in the colonial Office and a despatch from Sir Arthur Richards,dated the 6th December. The proposals include a general schemeto bridge the gap between the Native Authorities and the centreby the creation of three new Regional Councils with headquartersat Kaduna, Ibadan and Enugu. The Northern Council is to consistof a House of Chiefs (24) and a House of Assembly (39); thereis to be a Western Assembly of 29; and an Eastern Assembly of27. These regional councils are to have unofficial majorities,mainly selected from existing Native Authorities by themselves.They will have the right to discuss all general legislation,and to pass their own regional budgets, which, subject to approvalfrom the Governor, will be passed by a block vote at the centre.At the same time each Regional Centre will have an AdministrativeHeadquarters, largely decentralised from Lagos, whose departmentalheads will there have Deputies. Finally, the Councils will actas electoral colleges to the central Council, which is alsoto have an unofficial majority (25 to 24), and which will legislatefor the whole of Nigeria (with a budget session held in rotationat the four main centres). Other details include a Supreme Courtfor the whole of Nigeria, and a reorganisation in the Colonyof Lagos, whose urban limits are to become a municipality. Thescheme is proposed for 9 years with reviews of the system ofdirect nomination at the end of the 3rd and possibly the 6th. The proposals, which as Sessional Paper No. 4 were passed unanimouslyin the Nigerian Legislature on 22nd March, have still to bediscussed in the British Parliament. They are here consideredby a former Governor, and a former Lieut-Governor. It was hopedto have comments from Nigeria itself, where there has been considerableunofficial criticism, but this has had to be held over.     

Congressional Leadership 1965–96: A New Look at the Extremism versus Centrality Debate

Abstract An examination of the differences between the ideological positions of leaders and other members in the U.S. House of Representatives (1965–96) demonstrates that Republican leaders tend to be significantly to the right of the median Republican member and Democratic leaders tend to be significantly to the left of the median Democratic member. Furthermore, leaders from both parties tend to be ideologically located near the mode of their party's ideological distribution. These empirical results have implications for issues such as party polarization, conditional party government, and the possibility of separating out party and ideology.