Terrorism,Signaling, and Suicide Attack

This article examines the strategic utility of suicide terrorism. Suicide terrorism, we suggest, can be thought of as a form of strategic "signaling." We define terrorism as a signaling game in which terrorist attacks are used to communicate a group's character and objectives to a set of target audiences. This is followed by an examination of the utility of suicide attacks as a signaling tactic. The relative effectiveness of suicide operations is evaluated in relation to other tactical options that are traditionally available to terrorist organizations. We go on to examine the institutional and social context of suicide terrorism, concluding with an examination of the evolutionary use of suicide attacks by Palestinian terrorist organizations and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam.‐     

CRIME BY COMMITTEE: CONSPIRATORS AND COMPANY MEN IN THE ILLEGAL ELECTRICAL INDUSTRY CARTEL, 1954–19591

We show how cartels rely on the adaptive social structure of committee meetings to ameliorate the competitive difficulties of markets. We distill the structure of the cartel committee and test hypotheses relating market structure to committee structure and ultimately to the efficacy of cartel price‐fixing. Cartel continuity and the corporate authority of the cartel are strong predictors of cartel effectiveness. Cartel continuity is responsive to market conditions that favor cartel formation. Centralization of cartel authority in decision making results in improved collusive pricing effectiveness. Centralization of cartel authority responds to expanding industry volume that bring about incentives to increase firm level market share at the expense of other cartel members.     

The Iraq War,Partisanship, and Candidate Attributes: Variation in Partisan Swing in the 2006 U.S. House Elections

Although partisan swing is often assumed to be uniform across congressional districts, our analysis of the 2006 House elections demonstrates that systematic variation exists. In addition to incumbency status, partisanship, spending, and scandal, variation in the local salience of national issues across districts affects vote shifts in these districts. Notably, partisan swing in Republican districts proved highly sensitive to the number of Iraq war deaths from that district and, to a lesser degree, to the roll‐call vote of Republican House members on the war resolution. These findings have implications for theories of anticipatory representation, retrospective voting, and electoral accountability.     

DIFFUSION OF FRAUD: INTERMEDIATE ECONOMIC CRIME AND INVESTOR DYNAMICS*

Criminologists have studied the spread of fraudulent practices and techniques among perpetrators. This article attempts to contribute to the field by looking at the other side of diffusion, examining the spread of fraud among investors in a case of “intermediate fraud.” Intermediate fraud occurs when fraudulent acts are committed in or by a legitimate business. Using comprehensive archival, interview, and survey data, we analyze a business that exhibited a two‐stage pattern of intermediate fraud: It was created and operated as a legitimate business in the first stage, and then economic crimes were increasingly committed in the second stage. We use diffusion theory to guide our analysis, investigating the ways in which five factors—product attributes, buyer attributes and behavior, seller attributes and behavior, structure of the social network, and method of propagation—influence the adoption and diffusion of investments in oil and gas wells among a population of investors. The case of intermediate fraud is interesting because the factors that contributed to the success of the business in its legitimate stage are the same factors that contributed to the success of the fraud in its illegitimate stage.