Doctors under the knife

With Bill Clinton's new reforms only a month away, the health-care system is on the operating table--and the doctors are under the knife. Americans have a love-hate relationship with physicians: they like the care that doctors provide but hold them to blame for the nation's health-care mess. NEWSWEEK looks at how the culture of medicine may change, assesses doctors' fears--and examines the brave new world of HMOs.     

Reviews

Wing Thye Woo, Stephen Parker & Jeffrey D. Sachs (eds), Economies in Transition: Comparing Asia and Eastern Europe. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1997, xiv + 412 pp., £33.95 h/b, £16.95 p/b.

Guy Standing, Russian Unemployment and Enterprise Restructuring: Reviving Dead Souls. Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1996, xxix + 404 pp., £45.00.

Ellen Mickiewicz, Changing Channels: Television and the Struggle for Power in Russia. New York: Oxford University Press, 1997, xiii + 340 pp., $35.00.

Naum Nim (ed.), Dos'e na tsenzuru, No. 1. Moscow: Fond zashchity glasnosti, 1997, 208 pp.

Taras Kuzio, Ukraine under Kuchma: Political Reform, Economic Transformation and Security Policy in Independent Ukraine. Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1997, xxiii + 281 pp., £50.00.

Mary Buckley (ed.), Post‐Soviet Women: from the Baltic to Central Asia. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997, xvii + 316 pp., £15.95.

Neil Hood, Robert Kilis & Jan‐Erik Vahlne (eds), Transition in the Baltic States: Micro‐level Studies. Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1997, xv + 299 pp., £50.00.

V. Stanley Vardis & Judith B. Sedaitis, Lithuania: The Rebel Nation. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1997, xi + 242 pp., £14.50.

Lonnie R. Johnson, Central Europe. Enemies, Neighbours, Friends. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996, xii + 339 pp., £15.99.

Gale Stokes, Three Eras of Political Change in Eastern Europe. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997, xvi + 240 pp., £13.99.

Kevin F. F. Quigley, For Democracy's Sake: Foundations and Democracy Assistance in Central Europe. Washington, DC: The Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 1997, xix + 190 pp., £13.00.

James Gow, Triumph of the Lack of Will. International Diplomacy and the Yugoslav War. London: C. Hurst and Co., 1997, 343 pp., £14.95.

Robert Chenciner, Daghestan: Tradition and Survival. Richmond: Curzon, 1997, xi + 307 pp., £25.00

William C. Wohlforth (ed.), Witnesses to the End of the Cold War. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996, xvi + 344 pp., $39.95.

Vladimir N. Brovkin (ed.), The Bolsheviks in Russian Society: The Revolution and the Civil Wars. London: Yale University Press, 1997, vi + 333 pp., £21.00.

Carl Van Dyke, The Soviet Invasion of Finland 1939–40. London: Frank Cass, 1997, xiv + 288 pp., £35.00.

Maurice Friedberg, Literary Translation in Russia: A Cultural History, University Park, Pennsylvania: The Pennsylvania University Press, 1997, viii + 224 pp.     

The relationship of abuse and witnessing violence on the Child Abuse Potential Inventory with black adolescents

A number of social and psychological factors present in most adolescent parents place them at high risk for abusive behavior toward their children. However, current child abuse potential measures do not include adolescent samples as part of the psychometric data base. Consequently, the purpose of this study was twofold: (1) to investigate whether a Black adolescent sample would perform differently than an adult nonabusing sample on the Child Abuse Potential Inventory (CAP), and (2) to examine the relationship between history of abuse or witnessing violence to scores on the CAP. Results revealed that Black adolescents scored significantly higher than the adult normative sample on the CAP; consequently, cutoff scores need to be empirically established for adolescents. Additional analyses indicated that a history of abuse, as well as a history of witnessing violence, are associated with a high potential for abuse.     

Justice and Culture: Rawls, Sen, Nussbaum and O'Neill

Is it possible, in a multicultural world, to hold all societies to a common standard of decency that is both high enough to protect basic human interests, and yet not biased in the direction of particular cultural values? We examine the recent work of four liberals – John Rawls, Amartya Sen, Martha Nussbaum and Onora O'Neill – to see whether any of them has given a successful answer to this question. For Rawls, the decency standard is set by reference to an idea of basic human rights that we argue offers too little protection to members of non-liberal societies. Sen and Nussbaum both employ the idea of human capabilities, but in interestingly different ways: for Sen the problems are how to weight different capabilities, and how to decide which are basic, whereas for Nussbaum the difficulty is that her favoured list of capabilities depends on an appeal to autonomy that is unlikely to be acceptable to non-liberal cultures. O'Neill rejects a rights-based approach in favour of a neo-Kantian position that asks which principles of action people everywhere could consent to, but this also may be too weak in the face of cultural diversity. We conclude that liberals need to argue both for a minimum decency standard and for the full set of liberal rights as the best guarantors of that standard over time.     

Optimal Central Banker Contracts and Common Agency

This paper considers the contracting approach to centralbanking in a simple common agency model. We suggest thatcentral banker contracts that do not consider the possibilityof more than one principal existing are incomplete contracts.Such incomplete contracts can be a poor form ofmonetary policy delegation under common agency. We develop amodel with two principals – society (government) and ageneric interest group, whose objective conflicts withsociety’s ex ante preferences by incorporating an inflationarybias. We determine when the government-offered orinterest-group-offered contract dominates the central banker’sdecision. The results largely depend on whether theinterest-group-offered contract is written in terms of outputor inflation.     

Economic Threats or Societal Turmoil? Understanding Preferences for Authoritarian Political Systems

Why do some individuals prefer to be governed in an authoritarian political system? One intuitive answer is that citizens prefer authoritarian rule when the economy and society are in turmoil. These are common explanations for democratic backsliding, and the emergence and success of authoritarian leaders in the twentieth century. Which of these explanations better explains preferences for authoritarian rule? Both types of threat coincide in small samples and high-profile cases, creating inferential problems. I address this by using three waves of World Values Survey data to look at individual-level preferences for different forms of authoritarian government. Using multiple macroeconomic and societal indicators, I find that economic threats, especially increasing income inequality, better explain preferences for authoritarian government. I conclude with implications for understanding the emergence of support for authoritarianism in fledgling democracies.