Dharmakīrti on the role of causation in inference as presented in Pramāṇavārttika Svopajñavṛtti 11–38

In the svārthānumāna chapter of his Pramāṇavārttika, the Buddhist philosopher Dharmakīrti presented a defense of his claim that legitimate inference must rest on a metaphysical basis if it is to be immune from the risks ordinarily involved in inducing general principles from a finite number of observations. Even if one repeatedly observes that x occurs with y and never observes y in the absence of x, there is no guarantee, on the basis of observation alone, that one will never observe y in the absence of x at some point in the future. To provide such a guarantee, claims Dharmakīrti, one must know that there is a causal connection between x and y such that there is no possibility of y occurring in the absence of x. In the course of defending this central claim, Dharmakīrti ponders how one can know that there is a causal relationship of the kind necessary to guarantee a proposition of the form “Every y occurs with an x.” He also dismisses an interpretation of his predecessor Dignāga whereby Dignāga would be claiming non-observation of y in the absence of x is sufficient to warrant to the claim that no y occurs without x. The present article consists of a translation of kārikās 11–38 of Pramānavārttikam, svārthānumānaparicchedaḥ along with Dharmakīrti’s own prose commentary. The translators have also provided an English commentary, which includes a detailed introduction to the central issues in the translated text and their history in the literature before Dharmakīrti.     

Mental health legislation and human rights in England, Wales and the Republic of Ireland

In 2005, the World Health Organization (WHO) published its Resource Book on Mental Health, Human Rights and Legislation (Geneva: WHO) presenting a detailed statement of human rights issues which need to be addressed in national legislation relating to mental health. The purpose of this paper is to determine the extent to which revised mental health legislation in England, Wales (2007) and Ireland (2001) accords with these standards (excluding standards relating solely to children or mentally-ill offenders).Legislation in England and Wales meets 90 (54.2%) of the 166 WHO standards examined, while legislation in Ireland meets 80 standards (48.2%). Areas of high compliance include definitions of mental disorder, relatively robust procedures for involuntary admission and treatment (although provision of information remains suboptimal) and clarity regarding offences and penalties Areas of medium compliance relate to competence, capacity and consent (with a particular deficit in capacity legislation in Ireland), oversight and review (which exclude long-term voluntary patients and require more robust complaints procedures), and rules governing special treatments, seclusion and restraint. Areas of low compliance relate to promoting rights (impacting on other areas within legislation, such as information management), voluntary patients (especially non-protesting, incapacitated patients), protection of vulnerable groups and emergency treatment. The greatest single deficit in both jurisdictions relates to economic and social rights.There are four key areas in need of rectification and clarification in relation to mental health legislation in England, Wales and Ireland; these relate to (1) measures to protect and promote the rights of voluntary patients; (2) issues relating to competence, capacity and consent (especially in Ireland); (3) the role of “common law” in relation to mental health law (especially in England and Wales); and (4) the extent to which each jurisdiction wishes to protect the economic and social rights of the mentally ill through mental health legislation rather than general legislation.It is hoped that this preliminary analysis of mental health legislation will prompt deeper national audits of mental health and general law as it relates to the mentally ill, performed by multi-disciplinary committees, as recommended by the WHO.     

The ethics of the affordability of health insurance

In this essay we argue that the concept of affordable health insurance is rooted in a social obligation to protect fair equality of opportunity. Specifically, health insurance plays a limited but significant role in protecting opportunity in two ways: it helps keep people functioning normally and it protects their financial security. Together these benefits enable household members to exercise reasonable choices about their plans of life. To achieve truly affordable coverage, society must be able to contain the overall cost of health care, and health insurance must be progressively financed, meaning that those who are best able to pay for coverage should pay the largest share. While the recently passed Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA) falls short on both of these counts, we argue that it makes important contributions toward household affordability through the use of subsidies and regulations. The main shortcoming of the ACA is an insufficient protection against burdensome cost sharing, which we illustrate using several hypothetical scenarios. We conclude with recommendations about how to make opportunity-enhancing expansions to the current coverage subsidies.     

The limited effects of testimony on political persuasion

The procedure of witness testimony and cross-examination under oath, which is institutionalized in the court system and in Congress, may increase the credibility of political messages by strengthening perceived incentives for truth-telling. In this paper, I test the hypothesis that testimony can increase the persuasiveness of empirical claims in realistic political settings. However, results from a large number of experiments, including numerous national survey experiments, indicate that describing statements as being made in congressional or court testimony rarely generates significant change in respondents?? beliefs or attitudes??a result that is robust to numerous experimental design variations.