Public Opinion and the Role of Government Arts Funding in Spain

While several studies have probed the determinants of public support for government funding of arts and culture in the United States, little work to date has addressed the question in Europe. Yet as private cultural funding increases in magnitude in most Western European countries, the answer to this question has policy implications. This article formalizes the theory of the determinants of this public support in a model, employs public opinion data from Spain to estimate this model, and compares the results with those from the U.S. I find that support in Spain increases strongly with age, but is insignificant in most other variables. The article's empirical results yield several lessons for cultural policy design.     

Corruption,Cooperation and Endogenous Time Discount Rates

Virtually all uses of repeated games tostudy of cooperation assume that people'stime discount rates are exogenous andfixed. Here we offer an evolutionary gameembedded in a multi-period model ofinvestment and consumption in whichindividual time discounts are determined bytheir convergence to values determined byEvolutionary Stable Strategies. Oursubstantive motivation, though, iscorruption and its relationship to economicgrowth. To understand the observedrelationship between levels of corruptionand economic indicators of social welfare,we argue that corruption is a form ofcooperation that requires closeinterpersonal monitoring. If we assume,moreover, that when people discount thefuture greatly the only sustainable formsof cooperation are those that allow forclose monitoring, then our analysis can beinterpreted as a dynamic model of therelationship between corruption andinvestment.     

North-South Climate Change Negotiations: A Sequential Game with Asymmetric Information

This article determines the conditions under which theSouthern countries should act together, or separately, whilenegotiating with the North about climate change policy andabout the conditions for future Southern engagement. The papermodels the international negotiations with complete and withasymmetric information in a dynamic framework. Results showthat, depending on their characteristics, the differentplayers can obtain benefits delaying the moment of theagreement.     

A Spatial Model of U.S. Senate Elections

The importance of primaryelections is considered within the contextof U.S. Senate elections where senatorsserve overlapping terms and voters areassumed to balance their two senatorsagainst each other. Voters behavestrategically in the primaries butconvergence to the median position is notachieved except as a knife-edge result.More generally, constraints in the partyspace prevent the party of the sittingsenator from obtaining the median'spreference allowing the opposition party tonominate a candidate further away from themedian while still capturing the medianvoter. Empirical evidence supports thenotion that senate divergence is a functionof the state primary system.