Erosion and Variety in Pay for High Public Office

Two elements have characterized the rewards for public officials in the past two decades. One is the erosion of pay and perquisites in many democratic countries. The other is a continuing variety of rewards, especially when compared to those in the private sector. Using data from a variety of OECD countries and the European Union, this article investigates alternative explanations for these two elements. The data is adjusted for purchasing power of the different currencies and then related to the relative wealth of the countries. We find that ideas, interests and institutions all have some explanatory power, but that none is sufficient by itself to explain either variety or erosion in pay across the range of countries. The policy implications of these findings, in terms of both “how” and “how much” public officials should be paid, are also examined.     

DOES MARRIAGE REDUCE CRIME? A COUNTERFACTUAL APPROACH TO WITHIN‐INDIVIDUAL CAUSAL EFFECTS*

Although marriage is associated with a plethora of adult outcomes, its causal status remains controversial in the absence of experimental evidence. We address this problem by introducing a counterfactual life‐course approach that applies inverse probability of treatment weighting (IPTW) to yearly longitudinal data on marriage, crime, and shared covariates in a sample of 500 high‐risk boys followed prospectively from adolescence to age 32. The data consist of criminal histories and death records for all 500 men plus personal interviews, using a life‐history calendar, with a stratified subsample of 52 men followed to age 70. These data are linked to an extensive battery of individual and family background measures gathered from childhood to age 17 — before entry into marriage. Applying IPTW to multiple specifications that also incorporate extensive time‐varying covariates in adulthood, being married is associated with an average reduction of approximately 35 percent in the odds of crime compared to nonmarried states for the same man. These results are robust, supporting the inference that states of marriage causally inhibit crime over the life course.     

INVESTIGATING THE STABILITY OF CO‐OFFENDING AND CO‐OFFENDERS AMONG A SAMPLE OF YOUTHFUL OFFENDERS*

Scholars have long argued that delinquency is a group phenomenon. Even so, minimal research exists on the nature, structure, and process of co‐offending. This investigation focuses on a particular void, namely the stability of 1) co‐offending and 2) co‐offender selection over time, for which divergent theoretical expectations currently exist that bear on issues central to general and developmental/life‐course theories of crime. By relying on individual‐level, longitudinal data for a sample of juvenile offenders from Philadelphia, we find that distinct trajectories of co‐offending exist over the course of the juvenile criminal career. This inquiry also develops an individualized measure of co‐offender stability, which reveals that delinquents generally tend not to “reuse” co‐offenders, although frequent offenders show a greater propensity to do so. The discussion considers the theoretical and policy implications of these findings as well as provides some avenues for future research.     

Who Blinks First? Legislative Patience and Bargaining with Governors

When legislators and governors clash over the size of American state government, what strategic factors determine who wins? Efforts to address this question have traditionally relied upon setter models borrowed from the congressional literature and have predicted legislative dominance. We offer an alternative simplification of state budget negotiations that follows the “staring match” logic captured by divide‐the‐dollar games. Our model predicts that governors will often be powerful but that professional legislatures can stand up to the executives when long legislative sessions give them the patience to endure a protracted battle over the size of the budget. In this article, we present our analysis of an original dataset comprising gubernatorial budget proposals and legislative enactments in the states from 1989 through 2004. The results indicate strong empirical support for our predictions.     

The Legal Factor in a Changing Africa

The address which follows was given before a joint meeting ofthe Royal African Society and the Royal Empire Society on July22, 1955. The meeting was arranged to coincide with the Commonwealthand Empire Legal Conference, and Colonel Charles Ponson by,T.D., D.L., presided.     

VARIATION IN AFRICAN-AMERICAN HOMICIDE RATES: AN ASSESSMENT OF POTENTIAL EXPLANATIONS*

Using 1990 data for 222 metropolitan areas, this study extends the traditional variables examined in models of homicide and uses regression analysis to test the viability of three alternative theories that may explain high rates of African-American homicide victimization. The first approach examines the extent to which weak forms of social control have contributed to high homicide rates. The second approach tests the notion that discrimination and inequality have increased levels of absolute and relative deprivation for blacks, which in turn engender frustration and contribute to higher levels of violence. The third approach posits that engagement in violent activity may be a rational act for young African-American males faced with the reality of highly limited economic opportunities. While all three approaches contribute to explaining high African-American homicide, this study shows the greatest support for the social control explanation.