Party systems and the dynamics of government support: Britain and Germany, 1960–1990

Abstract. This paper examines the impact that one feature of a country's institutional context -the party system - has on public support for governing parties in two West European democracies, Germany and Great Britain. Specifically, it argues that models of government popularity need to take politics and institutions into account, and need to do so in a systematic fashion. Using measures of party system fractionalization and public opinion data spanning the period from 1960 to 1990, the paper demonstrates that the effects of economic conditions on government support are mediated by the choices available to citizens to express discontent with the ruling party. The greater the effective number of parties in a system, the stronger the effects of macro-economic performance on support for the government.     

The dynamics of racial exclusion and expulsion: racist politics in western Europe

Abstract. The concept of political racism is necessarily more specific than the more universal concepts of racism used in social science outside the sphere of politics. Thus, despite the common tendency to explain political racism using theories developed to account for other forms of racism, one turns most profitably to a range of political factors operating differently in time and/or location in order to arrive at the most thorough understanding of the expression of political racism. However, that does not deny the relevance of certain theories of more general racism in recognizing those circumstances that predispose to political racism. Some major theories in sociology and social psychology that might be applicable to political racism are described and their respective usefulness is assessed on the basis of available evidence about support for political racism in four west European countries.     

BUREAUCRACIES REMEMBER,POST‐BUREAUCRATIC ORGANIZATIONS FORGET?

The paper examines the hypothesis that post-bureaucratic forms of organization perform less well than traditional bureaucracies with respect both to organizational memory and learning from experience. First, the paper discusses the meanings of the main terms and concepts to be used in the argument, and delimits its domain. Second, it identifies a series of mechanisms that are likely to bring about memory loss. Third, it examines the empirical literature in search of evidence to confirm or disconfirm the existence and effects of these mechanisms. Fourth, it reflects on its own limitations. Finally, it sets out some broad conclusions concerning the state of organizational memories in the public sector. The aim is to develop new theory, identify relevant generative mechanisms, set this model alongside such evidence as is available, and suggest lines for further research.

The new men of the Empire are the ones who believe in fresh starts, new chapters, clean pages; I struggle on with the old story, hoping that, before it is finished, it will reveal to me why it was that I thought it worth the trouble. (J. M. Coetzee, Waiting for the Barbarians , 1980, p. 26)

     

WHAT’S MEASURED IS WHAT MATTERS: TARGETS AND GAMING IN THE ENGLISH PUBLIC HEALTH CARE SYSTEM

In the 2000s, governments in the UK, particularly in England, developed a system of governance of public services that combined targets with an element of terror. This has obvious parallels with the Soviet regime, which was initially successful but then collapsed. Assumptions underlying governance by targets represent synecdoche (taking a part to stand for a whole); and that problems of measurement and gaming do not matter. We examine the robustness of the regime of targets and terror to these assumptions using evidence from the English public health service on reported successes, problems of measurement, and gaming. Given this account, we consider the adequacy of current audit arrangements and ways of developing governance by targets in order to counter the problems we have identified.     

SCALE ECONOMIES AND IRON LAWS: MERGERS AND DEMERGERS IN WHITEHALL 1971–1984

Between 1971 and 1984 there were ten cases of merger or demerger in British central government departments, ranging in importance from the massive DTI demerger into four distinct departments (1973) to the absorption by the Lord Chancellor's Department of the Office of the Public Trustee (1982). By analysis of changes in aggregate indices of 'top staff', 'middle staff', ratio of administrative grades to total staff, salary costs relative to total budget, budget relative to total Government budget, and staff relative to total Civil Service staff, some common hypotheses about the rationale and effects of such bureau-shuffling are explored. It is found that, if anything, like attracts unlike (in terms of these indices); that change in scale creates neither economies nor diseconomies; that reorganization does not inevitably produce cost escalation (the 'Iron Law of Prodigality'); but that the 'Iron Law of Inertia' (reorganization in practice has little observable effect on bureaucratic structure and working) is supported by the observed results.