Bubbling up or cascading down? Public servants,political advisers and politicization

One of the strands in the growing scholarship on political advisers in parliamentary democracies proposes that advisers can reduce the risk of civil service politicization by furnishing partisan advice to ministers, freeing civil servants to focus on the provision of expert competence. This benign narrative generates a significant hypothesis, which is that the institutionalization of the partisan role diminishes the risk of civil service politicization. That hypothesis has yet to be fully tested. Several studies have assessed the impact of advisers' actions on civil service impartiality, but the consequences of bureaucrats' own agency for that dependent variable have received far less attention. Drawing on data from a survey of New Zealand public servants, this article challenges the assumption in the political advisers literature that civil service politicization is primarily driven by exogenous factors and calls for a more nuanced theoretical approach to endogenous aspects of politicization.     

Soft budgets and hard rents: a note on Kornai and Gomulka

This note shows how Kornai's concept of the soft budget constraint can be decomposed into separate elements of technical inefficiency and relative price distortion. The distinction between r-budget softness and m-budget softness introduced by Gomulka is shown to correspond to the equivalent and compensating variation measures of efficiency loss. It is also argued that budget softness should be viewed as the outcome of a rent-seeking process in which a firm's action in the control sphere incurs an opportunity cost in the real sphere. Adopting such a perspective leads to a re-definition of the resource loss associated with budget softness and results in much higher estimates of the social costs of soft budgets than those proposed in the existing literature.     

The Prince and the Duchess: The Honours of the Royal Family: An Unconsidered Area of the Royal Prerogative

This article traces the development of the use of the standard royal titles (prince/princess, Royal Highness) among members of British royal families other than Sovereigns from the medieval period to the present day. Usage is shown to have developed by evolution, and not to have been the subject of formal regulation, except in individual cases, until as late as 1917. Exceptions to the normal principles are considered in detail.Ann Lyon is Lecturer in Law at the University of Wales Swansea.     

'Unprecedented in Local Government Terms'– The Local Government Commission's Public Consultation Programme

The purpose of this article is to describe and evaluate the public consultation exercises mounted by the Local Government Commission for England under its successive Chairmen, Sir John Banham and Sir David Cooksey. The Commission was evidently proud of this aspect of its work, emphasizing repeatedly its unprecedented nature: in itself an unremarkable claim in the context of British local government structural reviews. This article suggests that, in terms of quality and value for money, as opposed to sheer scale, the consultation programme - and particularly the three principal tranches of MORI residential surveys - was less laudable. The article examines each of these surveys: the stage one community identity polls, which might have contributed to the government's intended 'community index', had the latter not previously been rejected by the Commission; the stage three option consultation surveys, the Banham Commission's instrument for the hybridization of English local government, which prompted accusations of policymaking by opinion poll; and the stage three 're-review' surveys for the Cooksey Commission, which had already indicated its disinclination to accord local public opinion any special weighting in its deliberations. The article attempts to summarize, in two key tables, both the results and the impact of the Commission's public consultations, and in doing so to trace the progress of the review from an initially proposed 99 new unitary authorities, down to 50, then 38, and back up to the final total of 46.