On democracy and debt

As we explained there is really little a priori reasoning for a clear prediction that authoritarian regimes will incur more foreign debt. In fact, some other empirical literature reveals that such regimes will face a higher supply price for such debt. Anderson presents a study of a single year using an admittedly crude measure of authoritarianism that finds that such regimes do issue more debt.This study provides a fuller examination of the empirical relationship between foreign debt and the nature of the polity's regime. Utilizing a continuous democracy variable and a continuous political liberty variable, it tests the relationship between debt and political variables. It finds little empirical support for the thesis that democracy or autocracy influence foreign debt levels. Generally the continuous variables are not significant if we use a linear in the logs specification. While a linear specification obtains results more consistent with the idea that level of democracy decreases debt, it also obtains results even less favorable to the idea that extreme forms of autocracy increase debt.     

AN EVALUATION OF FURTHER REFORMS IN THE DEMOCRATIC PARTY'S PRESIDENTIAL NOMINATION PROCESS

By 1992, the party of the majority, the Democratic Party, will have been out of power for twenty years of a twenty-four year span. Since 1968, numerous reforms in the presidential nominating process have been considered and adopted by the Democrats. These reforms have had the effect of opening the nominating process to rank-and-file Democrats through state primaries and participatory caucuses. While the reforms achieve this purpose, the end result is a mixed system that has been described as a disjointed hodgepodge of rules.
This article presents ten criteria of a sound nomination system. Then a panel of researchers and practitioners weighs seven options for further reform against the ten criteria. Several policy options are considered by the panel as improvements over the current presidential nomination system.     

Boom and Bust Budgeting: Repetitive Budgetary Processes in Nigeria, Kenya and Ghana

One of the least studied topics in comparative budgeting is how governments budget during economic and boom and bust cycles. Theory and past evidence suggest that national budgets of poorer countries are made and remade continuously over these periods. Case material from Nigeria as well as supplemental information from Ghana and Kenya illustrate the principal features of the persistence, types, and sequence of such repetitive budgeting. The experience of the three countries in boom and bust budgeting has considerable implications both for a theory of comparative budgeting and for national budget management and policy in Subsaharan Africa specifically.