Procedural Choice in Majoritarian Organizations

A puzzling feature of self‐governing organizations is persistent majority support for restrictive, seemingly nonmajoritarian, procedures (e.g., chairs and committees). This article provides a theory of self‐enforcing majoritarian commitment to restrictive procedures. We ask (1) why majorities consent to restrictive procedures in the first place, (2) why restrictive procedures survive challenges thereafter, and (3) with what policy consequences. In the model, a risk‐averse majority allocates procedural rights to increase procedural efficiency (i.e., reduce the procedural uncertainty of free‐for‐all bargaining). An equilibrium procedure is generally asymmetric and restrictive, generating nonmajoritarian policy bias. Still, a majority may persist in endorsing it so as to avoid amplifying procedural and policy uncertainty.     

Understandable Failure: The Eisenhower Administration's Strategic Goals in Iraq, 1953-1958

The present article contends that while the United States did not link Iraq to the West in a Northern Tier alliance aimed at containing the Soviet Union, the failure to do so was not principally a result of mistakes made by Washington. American actions in Iraq were constrained by the competing imperial ambitions of the United Kingdom and by the regional political goals of the Iraqi monarchy. The criticism that the Eisenhower administration undermined the stability of the Iraqi monarchy by not supplying it with sufficient aid, and encouraging it to join the unpopular Baghdad Pact ignores the importance that Britain and the Iraqi government itself had on fate of the Iraqi monarchy.