Do bonus offers shorten unemployment insurance spells? results from the washington experiment

Unemployment insurance is intended to reduce hardship by providing labor force members with partial wage replacement during periods of involuntary unemployment. However, in performing this income maintenance function, unemployment insurance may prolong spells of unemployment. Evidence from a field experiment conducted in Illinois in 1984 suggested that offering unemployment insurance claimants a modest cash bonus for rapid reemployment would increase the speed of return to work and reduce program costs. In 1988 a similar experiment, examining several different bonus offers, was conducted in the state of Washington. Evidence from the Washington experiment indicates that bonus offers do change job seeking behavior, but that only relatively generous bonus offers—about six times the weekly benefit amount—should be expected to significantly change the behavior of people eligible for unemployment benefits.     

Federal Court Responses to State and Local Claims of "Undue Burden" in Complying with The Americans with Disabilities Act

Are federal courts sympathetic to local and state officials'cost concerns, particularly when it comes to meeting the requirementsof the Americans with Disabilities Act? This is the fundamentalquery taken up by this analysis. After examining twenty-eightfederal ADA cases where state and local officials have goneto court claiming that complying with this civil rights measurewould be unduly burdensome, this study comes up with mixed findings.In some cases, the courts have been sensitive to cost concernsbut, in others, they have not. Despite these inconclusive findings,this study does cast some light on what state and local officialsmust do if they expect federal courts to be sensitive to theirconcerns.     

Government 'strength' and budget deficits in advanced democracies

Abstract. Roubini and Sachs provided the first systematic test of the idea that political structure the size, composition, diversity, and/or stability of a governing cabinet - is related to budget deficits. In this paper, we take issue with several of Roubini and Sachs' choices concerning data and operationalization, and argue that their approach cannot offer clear conclusions about the relationship between national political structure and budget deficits. We test the 'strength of government' hypothesis using central government finance data on 16 countries, 1959–1990. We measure deficits in a way that maximizes comparability across countries but avoids the potential problems of standardizing by GDP. We examine carefully the definition and measurement of 'strength of government', in light of recent theoretical and empirical work in comparative politics. We perform pooled time-series regression analysis of deficit change in 16 OECD countries for the period 1959–1990. We argue that while structural differences between governments may have little impact on deficits during good economic times, they may become especially noticeable and influential during periods when governments struggle to cope with severe economic problems.     

Books in review

He has also served as research director of the Guggenheim Foundation from 1972–1984. Among his books are Men in Groups; The Imperial Animal(with Robin Fox); The Manufacture of Evil;and The Pursuit of Pleasure.     

International organized crime

He has served as a consultant to the president’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, the National Security Council, and related agencies of the U.S. government. He has written, coauthored, or edited over sixteen books on intelligence and national security.     

The measurability of budget related rent-seeking

It has been suggested that the extent of rent-seeking expenditures arising from attempts to influence budget allocations should be estimated by the absolute magnitude of the observed changes in allocation. Instead, we argue that it is the extent of theex ante prospective changes that determine the level of rent-seeking, and that in the presence of countervailing activity these may be quite unrelated to the ex post observed values. We further argue that the traditional rent-seeking model of competition for a pre-specified rent is inappropriate in this context.