Income,Democracy, and Leader Turnover

While some believe that economic development prompts democratization, others contend that both result from distant historical causes. Using the most comprehensive estimates of national income available, I show that development is associated with more democratic government—but mostly in the medium run (10 to 20 years). This is because higher income tends to induce breakthroughs to more democratic politics only after an incumbent dictator leaves office. And in the short run, faster economic growth increases the ruler's survival odds. Leader turnover appears to matter because of selection: In authoritarian states, reformist leaders tend to either democratize or lose power relatively quickly, so long‐serving leaders are rarely reformers. Autocrats also become less activist after their first year in office. This logic helps explain why dictators, concerned only to prolong their rule, often inadvertently prepare their countries for jumps to democracy after they leave the scene.     

Popular Mobilizations in Lebanon: From Anti-System to Sectarian Claims

In Lebanon, the Arab uprising is often analyzed through the lens of the side effects the Syrian uprising had on the country thanks to the massive refugee influx and involvement of Sunni and Shia Lebanese in Syria’s battleground. In fact, popular mobilizations happened prior to and during the current crisis as two different types of effects of the Arab uprisings at large. First, in late 2010 emerged an anti-sectarian movement that brought up an anti-system claim in line with other Arab social movements targeting authoritarian regimes and corruption. Second, the Sunni radical mobilization that started in Saida in 2011 around the popular Imam Sheikh Assir gathered resentments toward the Shia leading party Hizbullah as involved alongside the Syrian regime and, surprisingly, adopting an active minority mobilization strategy. Both movements conducted demonstrations of different types (from classic marches to on-road sit-ins) starting from a completely opposite perspective and in a very different environment: when the anti-sectarian mobilization faded, the sectarian one rose. This article will try to address the historical process of both mobilizations and assess their differences in light of several mobilization theories. It intends to raise questions about the types of actors involved, their discourses and justifications, and the contextual local and political environments.     

Strengthening public health supply chains in Ethiopia: PEPFAR-supported expansion of access and availability

When the US President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR)-supported Supply Chain Management System (SCMS) programme began working in Ethiopia in 2006, the estimated population of people living with HIV exceeded one million, while only 24,000 were on treatment and only 50 treatment sites were in operation. SCMS and other key partners entered into this context to support the Ethiopian government in significantly strengthening the public health supply chain system, with the aim of increasing the availability and accessibility of pharmaceutical products. The country now has 1,047 treatment sites and is nearing complete treatment coverage. This article discusses how priorities were set among many competing challenges from 2006 until 2014, and how the four-step strategy of build, operate, transfer, and optimise has resulted in a successful partnership.     

How Do Public Goods Providers Play Public Goods Games?

We study how policymakers play public goods games, and how their behavior compares to the typical subjects we study, by conducting parallel experiments on college undergraduates and American state legislators. We find that the legislators play public goods games more cooperatively and more consistently than the undergraduates. Legislators are also less responsive to treatments that involve social elements but are more likely to respond to additional information that they receive. Further, legislators' fixed characteristics explain much of the variation in how legislators play the game. We discuss the implications of these findings for understanding how institutions affect the provision of public goods.     

Ontogeny of Size and Shape Sexual Dimorphism in the Pubis: A Multislice Computed Tomography Study by Geometric Morphometry

Few studies have been conducted to determine sex differences in the immature coxal bone and the results were often contradictory. The authors studied sexual dimorphic differences of the pubis using geometric morphometric analysis of five osteometric landmarks recorded by multislice computed tomography (MSCT), based on three‐dimensional reconstructions of 188 children (95 boys, 93 girls) living in the region of Toulouse, southwestern France, ranging in age from 1 to 18 years old. They used geometric morphometric methodology first to test sexual dimorphism in size (centroid size) and shape (Procrustes residuals) and second to examine patterns of shape change with age (development) and size change with age (growth). Based on statistical significance test results, the pubic shape became sexually dimorphic at 13 years old, although visible shape differences were observed as early as 9 years old. This work showed that the trajectories of pubis shape (development) and size (growth) differed throughout ontogeny and between sexes.