Reforming the equilibrium? Veto players and policy change in the European constitution-building process

The EU currently experiences a reform dilemma which is common to many international organizations composed of a large number of veto players who must adopt a change of the status quo. After the accession of ten countries in May 2004, the 25 governmental veto players adopted a modest reform text that proposes as many changes as it retains provisions of the Nice treaty. This ambivalent outcome raised much criticism and has been rejected by the French and Dutch voters who had to ratify the reform. This raises questions on the reasons for change and stability in organizations which attempt to reform their obsolete provisions under the constraint of many (types of) veto players. This study examines under which conditions the positions of the different types of veto players—governments, parliamentary ratification pivots, median voters and the supranational actors—are important to explain the outcome of the draft treaty. Our results suggest that the probability for reform is only determined by governmental gains when we control for parliamentary ratification pivots and median voters from status quo-prone member states. We also find that governments favoring the status quo retain their veto in case either parliaments or voters favor reform. This responsiveness is supported by the fact that median voters also matter when member states did not announce a referendum.     

In Force Without Significance: Kantian Nihilism and Agamben’s Critique of Law

In Homo Sacer, Giorgio Agamben makes the claim that Kant’s moral philosophy is prophetic of legal nihilism and modern totalitarianism. In doing so, he draws an implicit parallel between Kantian ethics of respect and autonomy, and the authoritarian constitutional theory of Carl Schmitt. This paper elucidates and evaluates this claim through an analysis of Agamben’s assertion that the legal condition of modernity is a nihilistic law that is ‘in force without significance’. I argue that the theoretical continuity between totalitarianism and the Moral Law is the problem of the undecidable, which arises when the empty ground of normative judgment comes to light.     

Intergovernmental Conflict and Indian Water Rights: An Assessment of Negotiated Settlements

The states and Indian tribes have fought bitterly over waterrights for nearly a century. Most of this conflict took placein courtrooms, but in recent years, states and tribes have beenattempting to resolve their differences through negotiated watersettlements. This article utilizes the literature and theoryon alternative dispute resolution to identify six advantagesthat are expected to accrue from negotiations. It then assessesthe extent to which Indian water settlements have produced theseresults.     

Exposure Reduction or Retaliation? The Effects of Domestic Violence Resources on Intimate‐Partner Homicide

Rates of homicide involving intimate partners have declined substantially over the past 25 years in the United States, while public awareness of and policy responses to domestic violence have grown. To what extent has the social response to domestic violence contributed to the decline in intimate‐partner homicide? We evaluate the relationship between intimate‐partner homicide and domestic violence prevention resources in 48 large cities between 1976 and 1996. Controlling for other influences, several types of prevention resources are linked to lower levels of intimate‐partner homicide, which we interpret in terms of their capacity to effectively reduce victims' exposure to abusive or violent partners. Other resources, however, are related to higher levels of homicide, suggesting a retaliation effect when interventions stimulate increased aggression without adequately reducing exposure. In light of other research on deficiencies in accessing and implementing prevention resources, our results suggest that too little exposure reduction in severely violent relationships may be worse than none at all.