Sovereign nations and global markets: modern British Conservatism and hyperglobalism

In this article we seek to trace through the major stands of British Euroscepticism and concentrate, in particular, on the importance of a powerful 'hyperglobalist' Eurosceptical strand within British Conservatism. We investigate the British Conservatives' recent divisions over European integration, against the background of the party's increasingly marginal status in British party politics. The piece also draws on findings from two recent surveys of the attitudes of British parliamentarians to European integration, carried out by the Members of Parliament Project for the Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC). We explore how Conservative divisions of opinion are related in part to particular understandings of globalisation and regionalisation and attempt to show how globalist ideology has unexpectedly re–emphasised and bolstered the traditional nationalism of the Tory party and caused an increasingly hostile attitude amongst many British Conservatives towards the European project as it is presently constituted. We also examine recent attempts to map British Conservative Euroscepticism on to continental varieties using a mixture of ideological positioning and party system (Taggart 1998), arguing that this ignores the extent to which British Eurosceptics advance unique (in EU member state terms) hyperglobalist (rather than isolationist or protectionist) arguments in objecting to further European integration.     

Representation is Democracy

During the Cold War, arguments about representation were a significant part of international debates about democracy. Proponents of minimal democracy dominated these arguments, and their thin notions of representation became political common sense. I propose a view of representation that differs from the main views advocated during the Cold War. Representation has a central positive role in democratic politics: I gain political representation when my authorized representative tries to achieve my political aims, subject to dialogue about those aims and to the use of mutually acceptable procedures for gaining them. Thus the opposite of representation is not participation. The opposite of representation is exclusion – and the opposite of participation is abstention. Rather than opposing participation to representation, we should try to improve representative practices and forms to make them more open, effective, and fair.     

Fission and Federalism: The Disaggregation of Canadian Party Activists

This article focuses on the Progressive Conservative (PC) partyof Canada and contrasts the orientations of four different setsof PC party workers: those who are active in the provincialarena in Nova Scotia and in Alberta, as well as those who areactive in the national arena from the same two provinces. Thedata reveal that federalism has had a disaggregative effecton Canadian political party ideology. Not only is the cleavagebetween activists in different orders of government consistentlylarge; it also generally exceeds that which exists between activistsin different provinces.     

Parties and Voters: What Creates the Ties?

The increasing instability in the electorate and the party system forces us to reconsider the Lipset-Rokkan thesis about the frozen party system. In this approach, cleavages played a major role, but in Western Europe, this role has diminished significantly. The frequent shifts in voter allegiance call for a new understanding of the mechanisms that connect voters and parties. A reinterpretation of the concepts of a "frozen party system" or "cleavages" is not enough. We need a new theory about the strategic interaction between parties and a floating electorate.     

Determinanten politischer Kultur am Beispiel des Schwyzer Stimmverhaltens

The new institutionalist approach is heavily committed to the idea that institutions matter. This article explores this commitment by examining the institutions of corporatism using comparative data in order to relate these to those of Konkordanzdemokratie. A neo-institutionalist perspective may be employed to illustrate how the institutions of Konkordanzdemokratie and macrocorporatism are related, both in terms of their origins as well as their policy outputs and outcomes. This article shows that both the conditions and the configuration of outputs and outcomes of Konkordanzdemokratie and corporatism are different. Therefore, one should clearly distinguish between these two sets of institutions. In a cross-sectional approach the configuration of socio-economic outcomes connected with these institutions are not as impressive as often claimed.