Technology transfer in the navy: The historical background

This report reviews technology transfer in light of the Stevenson-Wydler Technology Innovation Act of 1980. Following a brief introduction, a section on “Definitions” explains the several meanings that the phrase “technology transfer” now carries in policy discussions. The next section, on “Passive Technology Transfer”, reviews traditional Department of Defense scientific and technical information programs that relate to technology transfer. A section on “Military Industrial Transfer” examines technology transfer from the Defense Department to private industry, expecially to defense contractors. A section on “The Stevenson-Wydler Act and Active Technology Transfer” describes the principal provisions of the new act and why Congress passed it. The next two sections, on “NASA’s Technology Transfer Program” and “The Federal Laboratory Consortium” outline the two existing Government programs Congress relied upon in developing ideas for the new law. A section on “Implementation of the Stevenson-Wydler Act”, discusses several important issues that must be considered by Navy laboratory management as the new law is put into effect in the Navy. Finally, a brief conclusion emphasizes the major point of the report: That Congress, in passing the Stevenson-Wydler Act, did not fully consider what relationship the new technology transfer programs it was requiring in the Executive Branch should bear to existing programs with similar purposes. If the public interest is to be served, the report argues, the Navy must consciously and carefully determine the proper nature of this relationship.     

Excuses,Excuses: Self-Handicapping in an Australian Adolescent Sample

The purpose of the present study was to examine gender differences in the self-handicapping tendencies of a sample of 337 Australian school attending adolescents, who were aged between 15 and 19 years. Self-handicapping, as measured by the shortened Self-Handicapping Scale, was examined in relation to self-esteem, performance attributions, coping strategies, and the potential behavioral self-handicaps of reduced study hours and inefficient study habits. Girls scored significantly higher on the Self-Handicapping Scale and endorsed using emotional and illness related excuses significantly more often than boys. High self-handicapping scores independently predicted lower study hours for boys, and were associated with less efficient study for girls. Coping and attributional predictors of self-handicapping were found to be rumination, luck attribution, and poor active coping strategies for boys, and ability attributions, behavioral disengagement, instrumental support, and poor active coping strategies for girls.     

Justice and Culture: Rawls, Sen, Nussbaum and O'Neill

Is it possible, in a multicultural world, to hold all societies to a common standard of decency that is both high enough to protect basic human interests, and yet not biased in the direction of particular cultural values? We examine the recent work of four liberals – John Rawls, Amartya Sen, Martha Nussbaum and Onora O'Neill – to see whether any of them has given a successful answer to this question. For Rawls, the decency standard is set by reference to an idea of basic human rights that we argue offers too little protection to members of non-liberal societies. Sen and Nussbaum both employ the idea of human capabilities, but in interestingly different ways: for Sen the problems are how to weight different capabilities, and how to decide which are basic, whereas for Nussbaum the difficulty is that her favoured list of capabilities depends on an appeal to autonomy that is unlikely to be acceptable to non-liberal cultures. O'Neill rejects a rights-based approach in favour of a neo-Kantian position that asks which principles of action people everywhere could consent to, but this also may be too weak in the face of cultural diversity. We conclude that liberals need to argue both for a minimum decency standard and for the full set of liberal rights as the best guarantors of that standard over time.     

Transparency, Democratic Accountability, and the Economic Consequences of Monetary Institutions

Debates about the appropriate mix between autonomy and accountability of bureaucrats are relevant to numerous areas of government action. I examine whether there is evidence of a tradeoff between transparency, democratic accountability, and the gains from monetary delegation. I begin by presenting a simple theoretical model which suggests that central banks that are transparent, in the sense of publishing their macroeconomic forecasts, will find it easier to acquire a reputation. Despite making central banks more subject to outside scrutiny then, monetary transparency can lead to improved economic outcomes. I also consider arguments about the effect of accountability provisions involving parliamentary oversight and control over central bankers. The article then uses a new data set to examine these issues empirically, focusing on a natural experiment involving disinflation costs under different central banking institutions during the 1990s. Results suggest that countries with more transparent central banks face lower costs of disinflation while accountability provisions have no clear effect on disinflation costs. My results also concord with earlier findings that the effect of monetary institutions is conditional on other features of the political environment.