Decentralization for regional development: A comparative study of Tanzania,Zambia and Papua New Guinea

Decentralization has been a common aim in administrative reform and this article points to common themes in the decentralization programmes of Tanzania, Zambia and Papua New Guinea. The programmes involve both developing field administrative structures on an area basis in which horizontal links between the field staff of different ministries are at least as important as the vertical lines of authority linking field staff with headquarters' departments, and also decentralizing authority over planning and implementing development programmes to local decision making bodies. The impact of these decentralization programmes has not hitherto been adequately monitored or evaluated, and experience of attempts at doing this in Tanzania emphasizes the importance of building into a decentralization programme a method of monitoring it which produces usable information. The article points to the plans for monitoring to be pursued in Zambia.     

弱关系、强关系:墨西哥移民中的网络原则

移民过程一般是通过亲属网络和社会网络来策划安排的,原来居住于同一社区的移民在目的地的扩散与集聚,基本遵循五条有关移民网络及其动力学的相关原则:第一,网络是多区域性的。第二,移民们在移入目的地找到工作的工作地点构成了移民在当地的落脚点。第三,通向新的目的地的途径常常是通过"弱关系的力量"而得到的。第四,紧密网络和松散的、弱关系的或熟人的网络均构成其成员的"社会资本"。第五,移民在工作地点和工作类型的地理扩散与集聚受紧密关系网络成员(特别是近亲属)招工的影响。     

Y-chromosome STRs in an Antioquian (Colombia) population sample

Haplotype data were obtained from a sample of 777 unrelated male individuals from Antioquia Department (Colombia), for eight Y-chromosome STRs (DYS19, DYS385, DYS389 I, DYS389 II, DYS390, DYS391, DYS392 and DYS393). A total of 442 different haplotypes were identified of which 334 were represented only once in the database and the most frequent haplotype was found in 32 individuals. A high haplotype diversity was found (99.45%). Genetic distances were calculated using previously published haplotype data and the lowest values were found for the comparisons with samples of lberian origin.     

Applying Insights from Transaction Cost Economics to Improve Cost Estimates for Public Sector Purchases: The Case of U.S. Military Acquisition

ABSTRACT

This article uses Transaction Cost Economics (TCE) to help characterize, explain, and ultimately reduce the cost growth that plagues many of today's major investments in military capabilities. There is mounting evidence of a systematic bias in initial cost estimates of new weapon systems purchased by the U.S. military. Unrealistically low cost estimates result in cost overruns. Fixing cost overruns can substantially impact public budgets and military readiness. Cost estimates serve a dual function: first, as an integral part of the decision-making process to evaluate military purchases/investments, and second, as a baseline for future defense budgets. In the first case, underestimating costs can result in too many new weapon program starts and excessive investments in those systems. In the second case, unrealistically low cost estimates result in overly optimistic budgets. Budgets planned on the basis of optimistic cost estimates create the illusion of more resources available than actually exist. Two factors are often blamed for unrealistically low cost estimates: bad incentives (psychological and political-economic explanations), and bad forecasts (methodological explanations). While briefly exploring the former, the focus of this study is on cost estimating methodology. Conventional public cost estimating techniques focus on the production costs of public purchases (input costs, learning curves, economies of scale and scope, etc.). The goal of this article is to improve cost estimates by expanding conventional cost estimating methodology to include TCE considerations. The primary insight of TCE is that correctly forecasting economic production costs of government purchases or acquisitions is necessary, but not sufficient. TCE emphasizes another set of costs—coordination and motivation costs (search and information costs; decision, contracting, and incentive costs; measurement, monitoring, and enforcement costs, etc.). This study encourages public officials and cost analysts to capture these costs and to understand key characteristics of public-private transactions (uncertainty, complexity, frequency, asset specificity, and market contestability) to generate more complete and reliable cost estimates and improve public sector purchases.