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61.
Major efforts have been made bydevelopment organisations tomake their systems ofproject and programme management more participatory, in order to be accountable to local participants (or beneficiaries), while also creating opportunities for them to shape their own processes. These measures may look participatory, but have in effect become new (and often costly) forms of management and control, which do not result in great benefits for project participants. The authors argue that the dominance of three components- projects, professionals, and organisations-has beentaken for granted; andthat theyinvolve practices and processes which are primarily instruments of control, rather than of participation. Attempts to generate participation will thus require a fundamental change in the way in which these components operate. Inthe meantime, the authors call for attentiontobe paidtothe ways inwhichthe current tools of participatory development, including PRA, can be used to promote either participation or control, depending on how they are used. 相似文献
62.
63.
Doug Porter Matt Andrews Joel A. Turkewitz Clay G. Wescott 《International Public Management Journal》2013,16(4):369-394
ABSTRACT Successful transition from conflict and fragility hinges on the quality and legitimacy of public financial management (PFM) systems. This article shows that such systems develop asymmetrically in these settings. Formal aspects of modern systems are adopted, but a layered series of informal arrangements govern resource management. Analysis of data from Public Expenditure and Financial Accountability assessments of 101 countries explores aspects of this asymmetry and different explanations are considered for why elites seem to choose not to invest trust, resources, and capacity in making mainstream PFM systems functional. These explanations focus on the incentives created by three “public” resources: illicit flows, domestic revenues, and strategic or aid flows. Mainstream PFM systems are applied to a small part of these flows. The illustrative case of Cambodia shows how a layered system has emerged to govern such flows, undermining the influence of formal public finance management systems. The article offers suggestions to address these issues. 相似文献