Holding Mayors Accountable: New York's Executives from Koch to Bloomberg

How do citizens evaluate the performance of their mayors? Previous studies have examined mayoral performance either with cross‐sectional surveys or by comparing pairs of consecutive elections. In this article, we use 150 surveys conducted in New York City between 1984 and 2009 to carry out the first time‐series analysis of mayoral approval. We show that fluctuations in crime and the economy affect mayors’ ratings and that black and white citizens react similarly to changing local conditions (although their initial evaluations of mayors often diverge sharply). We also show that how New Yorkers rate mayors in the polls is closely related to how they vote for mayors at the polls.     

Bread and Peace Voting in U.S. Presidential Elections

A simple ``Bread and Peace'' model shows that aggregate votes forPresident in postwar elections were determined entirely byweighted-average growth of real disposable personal income percapita during the incumbent party's term and the cumulativenumbers of American military personnel killed in action as aresult of U.S. intervention in the Korean and Vietnamese civilwars. The model is subjected to robustness tests against twenty-two variations in functional form inspired by the extensiveliterature on presidential voting. Not one of these variationsadds value to the Bread and Peace model or significantly perturbsits coefficients.     

A Primer on Juvenile Protective Legislation

The parens patriae doctrine is grounded in the proposition that children sometimes need the law's protection from their own improvidence or immaturity, and sometimes even from the conduct of their parents or other caretakers. Parens patriae underlies much state and federal regulation in such areas as abuse, neglect, foster care, adoption, medical decisionmaking, support, and delinquency. The doctrine also underlies the wide range of protective legislation that regulates children's conduct, the subject of this article.     

Is wealth taxation a plausible reform?

Abstract: This paper cautions against rushing into the adoption of a wealth tax despite the pleas by some for such adoption on the basis of redistributing wealth. Based on judgment criteria, including administrative ease, certainty, revenue productivity, neutrality and even equity, the wealth tax, whether it he an annual tax or a one-time death tax, fails on all counts. Like the income tax which was initially imposed only on high incomes, the wealth tax would eventually be shifted to middle and lower income groups because they have fewer techniques by which to avoid the tax and that is also the only way the tax would pay for itself. The wealth tax has justifiably been labelled a “voluntary tax.” As with all taxes, Canada runs a risk in being different from close-by countries in that capital needed to develop the economy and provide employment may be driven out of the country. Before even considering a wealth tax, it might he instructive to look at why Canada abandoned inheritance taxes in the early 1970s and why Great Britain and Ireland abandoned annual wealth taxes after only a few years of imposition. Sommaire: Cette étude signale les dangers qu'il y aurait à opter trop rapidement pour I'impôt sur la fortune, même si certains réclament cette mesure au nom d'une redistribution de la richesse. Quand on examine les critères de jugement et, notamment, la facilité administrative, la certitude, la productivité de revenu, la neutralité et même I'équité., I'on constate que I'impôt sur la fortune est un échec sur toils les plans - qu'il s'agisse d'un impôt annuel ou d'un impôt unique faisant suite à un décès. De mμ que l'impôt siir le revenu, perçu à l'origine uniquement sur les hauts revenus, tin impôt sur la fortune arriverait éventuellement à frapper les contribuables à revenu moyen ou faihle. En effet, ceux-ci disposent de moins de moyens pour s'en protéger et c'est uniquement de cette façon que ce nouvel impôt ferait rentrer des fonds. L'on a qualifié, avec raison, I'impBt siir la fortune de «volontaire». De même qu'avec tous les autres impôts, le Canada court un risque en optant pour une voie différente de celle des pays avoisinants, car les capitaux nécessaires â I'essor de I'économie et à la création d'emplois pourraient alors sortir du pays. Mais, avant même d'envisager tin impôt sur la fortune, il serait peut-être hon dr comprendre pourquoi le Canada a ahandonné les impôts siir la succession ilu début des années soixante-dix et pourquoi la Grande-Bretagne et I'Irlande ont renoncé aux impôts annuels sur la fortune quelques années seulement après les avoir créé5.