Zur Abgrenzung von Verwaltung und Verf��gung �C eine dogmatische Frage von eminenter praktischer Bedeutung

Dass Verwaltungshandlungen von Verfügungsma?nahmen deutlich abzugrenzen sind, entspricht dem Grundverst?ndnis von Mit- und Wohnungseigentum. Dass sich die Notwendigkeit einer klaren Grenzziehung zwischen diesen Bereichen nicht zuletzt aus den gesetzlichen Vorgaben, wie insb den unterschiedlichen Konsenserfordernissen, ableitet, erscheint ebenso unzweifelhaft. Umso augenf?lliger sind Bemühungen in Rechtsprechung, Lehre und auch Gesetzgebung, den Bereich der Verwaltungsagenden zu Lasten der Verfügungen best?ndig zu erweitern. Der vorliegende Beitrag soll derartige Tendenzen vor dem Hintergrund der lex lata hinterfragen. Es sollen typische Fallkonstellationen an der Grenze zwischen Verwaltung und Verfügung n?her beleuchtet und der Versuch unternommen werden, die Grenzlinien pr?ziser abzustecken. Wo die geltende Rechtslage zu unbefriedigenden Ergebnissen führen muss, sollen zudem m?gliche Auswege aufgezeigt werden.     

Cooperation Coupled with Conflicts: Korea–Japan Relations in the Post-Cold War Era

This article addresses a profoundly curious question of why Korea and Japan conflict with each other despite deepening ties and growing transactions. In contrast to the existing explanations, this article makes three analytical innovations. First, for inducing cooperation between Korea and Japan, what matters is convergence/divergence of external threat perception, not the magnitude of threat. Second, history is not a constant but a variable. Historical contentions can be escalated or deescalated depending on political situations. Third, the role of the US in managing Korea–Japan relations is important but not determinant. The style of US engagement in East Asia serves as an intervening variable for conflict management. This article suggests that frictions are highest when historical contentions are escalated and external threat perception diverges. On the other hand, cooperation potential is highest when historical contentions are deescalated and threat perception converges.     

Soviet policy toward the two Koreas, 1985–1991: The new political thinking and power

This research explores the evolution of the Soviet Union’s Korea policy between 1985 and 1991, focusing on the correlation between Gorbachev’s shifting power position within the Soviet leadership and the development of the Soviet Union’s new policy toward the two Koreas. Soviet leaders utilized policy issues (foreign and domestic) to mobilize support in their internal power struggle. Conversely, they needed to establish a firm power base before launching new policies. Thus, power and policy in the Soviet political system often enjoyed a mutually reinforcing relationship, and foreign policy issues became entangled in the domestic political process. As Gorbachev’s power position improved and his reform policy (new political thinking) was refined, Soviet policy toward the two Koreas correspondingly evolved in three phases: (1) Gorbachev rising: the formulation of the new political thinking (March 1985–summer 1988); (2) Gorbachev ascendant: the implementation of new political thinking (fall 1988–summer 1990); and (3) Gorbachev in decline: the continuing momentum of the new policy (fall 1990–December 1991). In late 1990–1991, Soviet Korea policy was characterized by an undisguised tilt toward Seoul. Nevertheless, the Soviets did not consider Soviet relations with the two Koreas to be a zero-sum game. Moscow sought to establish a balanced relationship with both Pyongyang and Seoul, and hoped to play an active role in peace and security on the Korean peninsula.     

The 1984 election as Anthony downs and Stanley Kelley might interpret it

This paper is an analysis of two rational choice theories of elections. Anthony Downs and Stanley Kelley's theories yield complementary interpretations of the 1984 U. S. election. Reagan's victory was based on both prospective and retrospective judgments as well as on candidate and policy considerations. Reagan won that element of an incumbent's reelection that is a referendum on his performance as president. However, people also voted on the basis of domestic and foreign policy preferences for the second term. On these issues voters preferred Mondale as much as Reagan. Reagan's victory owed remarkably little to his conservative agenda and to a warm regard for his personal qualities as a leader. His landslide was deceptive. The two Reagan victories were among the weakest of the six landslides of the postwar period by Kelley's test of decisiveness. The Reagan elections have not set the United States on the course of a long-term conservative agenda in either domestic or foreign affairs.