City size and citizens' satisfaction: two competing theories revisited

Abstract. The Reform Theory and the Political Economy Theory postulate contradictory effects of government size on citizens' satisfaction with urban services. The former asserts that citizens' satisfaction increases with increasing size of urban governments because large units are more efficient and allows citizens to participate effectively in public policy-making. The latter postulates that citizens are more satisfied in the smaller jurisdictions because small units are more homogeneous, efficient and democratic. A series of tests performed in this study overwhelmingly supports the Political Economy Theory: citizens in small jurisdictions hold more favourable attitudes towards participation and democracy, and the smaller units are more homogeneous and more efficient in the provision of services. This in turn leads to more favourable evaluations of public services.     

GOVERNING WITHOUT GOVERNMENT? THE PRIVATE GOVERNANCE OF FOREST CERTIFICATION IN SWEDEN

The role and capacity of the state are changing. Some researchers argue that the state is transforming, strategically adapting to new circumstances, while others see a development of governing arrangements that are autonomous from the state, governing 'without' government. This article assesses the governing without government thesis through the case of forest certification introduced in Sweden in the late 1990s. This is a case of private governance, the governing capacity of which is based on voluntary self-regulation rather than government authority, seemingly a prime example of governing without government. The results show that government nonetheless is involved with forest certification through governance-oriented modes of governing: enabling and influencing the arrangements. Thus, what appeared to be a prime example of governing 'without' government is better understood as governing 'with' government.     

Television and the Incumbency Advantage in U.S. Elections

We use the structure of media markets within states and across state boundaries to study the relationship between television and electoral competition. In particular, we compare incumbent vote margins in media markets where content originates in the same state as media consumers versus vote margins where content originates out of state. This contrast provides a clear test of whether or not television coverage correlates with the incumbency advantage. We study U.S. Senate and state gubernatorial races from the 1950s through the 1990s and find that the effect of TV is small, directionally indeterminate, and statistically insignificant.     

DEMOCRACY AND GOVERNANCE NETWORKS: COMPATIBLE OR NOT?

This paper investigates the relationship between representative democracy and governance networks at a theoretical level. It does so by offering four conjectures and their implications for theory and practice. The incompatibility conjectures rests on the primacy of politics and sees governance networks as a threat. The complementarity conjecture presents governance networks as a means of enabling greater participation in the policy process and sensitivity in programme implementation. The transitional conjecture posits a wider evolution of governance forms towards network relationships. The instrumental conjecture views governance networks as a powerful means through which dominant interests can achieve their goals. Illustrative implications for theory and practice are identified, in relation to power in the policy process, the public interest, and the role of public managers. The heuristic potential of the conjectures is demonstrated through the identification of an outline research agenda.     

STRATEGY FORMATION IN PUBLIC AGENCIES

The main contribution of this study is the identification of three modes of strategy for public agencies based on strategic thought in a corporate environment. Strategic design, internal strategic scanning, and strategic governance embody three distinct modes of strategy relevant in the public sector. Programming actions, combining capabilities, and formation of networks capture the essence of these strategic orientations. By offering an organization‐based view of public sector strategy, this study puts public agencies at the centre of strategic examination. The fundamental unit of analysis within agencies is administrative duty, which connects administrative action with the democratic decision‐making process. These three strategy modes are based on complementary and, in some respects, contradictory theoretical assumptions, but all offer opportunities for confronting the diverse environments faced by public agencies. Each strategic orientation has a distinct approach to such features as the role of management, occupational groups, the environment, and types of capital.     

Will Your Job Disappear?

The double whammy of job‐displacing technological advance and wage‐deflating globalization has demoted the American middle class, even as the rich get richer from access to global markets and from their slice of profits from managing massive global financial flows. The specter of growing inequality is haunting free‐market capitalism as never before since the early days of the Industrial Revolution. What is happening? What is to be done? Top economists take a hard look at a hard reality.     

The Impact of Unified Party Government on Campaign Contributions

This article examines the connection between unified party government and campaign contributions. Our central argument is that unified party government confers a substantial, but previously overlooked, fundraising advantage to intra‐chamber majority parties. We examined data on corporate campaign contributions to U.S. House incumbents and state legislators in 17 different legislative chambers. We found a strong fundraising benefit accruing to intra‐chamber majority status across all of these legislatures, but the benefit is heavily conditioned by the presence of unified or divided government. The results offer important implications for our understanding of the financial balance of power in American politics and for the vast scholarly literature on unified party government.