Cost Benefit Study of the New Covent Garden Market

The Hon. Editor has received the following letter commenting on Professor Kirk's and Mr. Sloyan's article on the New Covent Garden Market (Vol. 56 Spring 1978). The author is lecturer in applied economics in the Department of Social and Economic Research, University of Glasgow. Mr. Heald's letter is followed by a reply by Professor Kirk on behalf of Mr. Sloyan and himself.     

Rewriting Roe v. Wade

Presented in this essay are suggestions for rewriting Roe vs. Wade, the case that resulted in the establishment of a constitutional right to abortion. Essentially, the argument is 1 of equal protection. It is suggested that abortion be viewed as presenting a problem that might be termed "the law of samaritanism" -- the law regarding obligations imposed on certain individuals to provide assistance to others. In American law it is a deeply rooted principle that an individual is ordinarily not required to volunteer assistance to another individual who is in danger or in need of aid. The argument presented maintains that if a pregnant woman is required to carry the fetus to term and deliver it, then she is being compelled to be a Good Samaritan. It is argued further that if the generally limited scope of obligations of samaritanism under current law are considered, and the special nature of the burdens imposed on pregnant women by laws forbidding abortion are also considered, the obvious conclusion is that the equal protection clause forbids imposition of these burdens on pregnant women. The argument is developed in a lengthy form and calls for an extended discussion of the law of samaritanism. The uniqueness of the abortion case also creates problems as the equal protection argument is approached, and an approach to equal protection questions is sketched.     

Social welfare functions when preferences are convex,strictly monotonic,and continuous

The paper shows that if the class of admissible preference orderings is restricted in a manner appropriate for economic and political models, then Arrow's impossibility theorem for social welfare functions continues to be valid. Specifically if the space of alternatives is R ₊ ⁿ , n ≥ 3, where each dimension represents a different public good and if each person's preferences are restricted to be convex, continuous, and strictly monotonic, then no social welfare function exists that satisfies unanimity, independence of irrelevant alternatives, and nondictatorship.