Consequences of restitution

A group of 419 adult property offenders granted probation and ordered to repay their victims for the direct monetary losses or property damage incurred as a result of their crime were matched on 28 variables to a group of 179 offenders who were not ordered to pay restitution to their victims. Compared to those not ordered to repay their victims, the offenders ordered to pay restitution had a more difficult probation experience, having more revocations filed against them and showing a greater frequency of reporting, physical health, and money problems. No difference in arrest rate or time on probation was discovered. Those offenders ordered to pay restitution but who did not pay in full had the greatest problems of all, showing the highest revocation filing and actual revocation rate, rate of convictions, and time served. Payment characteristics were described for offenders who paid all, part, or none of their restitution debt by probation's end. It was suggested that closer probation officer scrutiny of offenders ordered to pay restitution may have accounted for the more difficult experience of the restitution group and that cost of administration of restitution programs may not be worth the benefits.This research was funded in part by grant No. 76-ED-99-0027 from the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration. Special thanks are given the directors of Denver District Court Probation, without whose permission to enter the probation archives, and without whose day-to-day cooperation, this study would have been impossible.     

A Hard Look at What We Know (and Still Need to Learn) About the "Costs" of the Exclusionary Rule: The NIJ Study and Other Studies of "Lost" Arrests

The controversy over a "good faith mistake" exception to the exclusionary rule and the 1982 National Institute of Justice study of the effects of the rule in California have focused attention on the "costs" of the rule. This article reviews the NIJ study and seven other relevant studies and concludes that the NIJ study's claim that the rule has a "major impact" on the disposition of felony arrests is misleading and exaggerated. California data show that prosecutors reject only 0.8% (8 in 1,000) of felony arrests because of illegal searches. The effect of the rule is concentrated in drug cases in which the rejection rate by prosecutors is 2.4% (not 30%, as suggested by the NIJ study), but the rejection rate for non-drug arrests is less than 0.3%, and the rate is even lower for violent crimes. Even if one looks at the cumulative effect of the rule through all stages of the felony process in California, only about 2.35% of felony arrests are lost because of illegal searches, and this is a high-side estimate based on potentially atypical samples. Moreover, studies of "lost arrests" have not differentiated between arrests resulting from bona fide crime investigations and arrests that resulted from arbitrary searches or arrests that were made to seize contraband, for harassment, or for purposes other than obtaining a conviction. The author concludes that available data show the cost of the rule is marginal, especially in view of the ambiguous nature of the lost arrests. Moreover, it is doubtful that a good faith mistake exception would save any substantial proportion of the arrests lost following illegal searches. In particular, an exception for searches conducted under an improper warrant would save only a negligible proportion of lost arrests.