Prerequisities and Consequences of Ethnic Mobilization in Modern Society*

There are abundant observations of a revival of ethnic feelings among linguistic, territorial minorities in advanced, industrialized societies. Less is known about the nature and intrinsic qualities of this revival. An assessment of the implications of the renaissance of ethnicity requires an analysis both of changes in the nature of ethnicity and of basic organisatory principles in the modem society. The increasing importance of categorizations and labeling performed by the minorities themselves has important implications for policies concerning ethnic and linguistic minorities.     

Electoral formulas: A macroscopic perspective

Abstract The paper offers a macroscopic view of the legislative electoral formulas in force in 166 sovereign countries, whether democratic or not. The purpose is to determine which formulas are the most widespread, and whether the prevalence of a formula is correlated with geographical, historical, economic, and political factors. While plurality and PR systems are equally frequent, the former tend to be found in more populated countries. PR prevails in Europe and South America, and among the most democratic countries, while the plurality rule is more typical of Asia, Africa, and North America, and is especially popular among former British colonies. Large countries are more likely to opt for single–member districts. No significant correlation emerges between the level of economic development or French colonial background and any electoral formula. The study suggests that the selection of an electoral system is not merely the outcome of party interest, but is also strongly influenced by ideas about what is good, just, or efficient.     

Conceptualizing Politics: Strategic or Communicative Action?

Following the "behavioral revolution" in the social sciences, analyzing political behavior as strategic action has become a dominant paradigm in political science. However, many political processes become incomprehensible from a purely strategic angle. Only a concept of politics as communicative action can explain how people reach mutual agreements on factual and normative matters. Some analysts seem to assume that whenever actors take a position in a debate that coincides with their own interest, the employed arguments must be understood as a strategic device to promote this self-interest But this explanation in most cases seems too simplistic and, from a communicative perspective, beside the point. In an open debate it will still be the rational weight of the arguments that matters, not the eventual strategic interests of the participants. Rational communication is a precondition for civilized conflict resolution as well as for the stability and durability of the political order.
Max Weber provided us with a typology of goal-oriented behavior which included, along with the rational self-interest variety, which he called Zweckrationalität , or instrumental behavior, Wertrationalität , or absolute value-oriented behavior, traditional or habitual behavior, and impulsive behavior. From this perspective we can see what a small part of the reality we, as social scientists, want to explain is captured by the rational choice model (Almond 1991, 49).     

Turnout in electoral democracies

Abstract. We examine turnout in 324 democratic national lower house elections held in 91 countries, between 1972 and 1995. We rely on Freedom House ratings of political rights to determine whether an election is democratic or not. We distinguish three blocs of factors that affect turnout: the socio–economic environment, institutions, and party systems. We show that turnout is influenced by a great number of factors and that the patterns that have been shown to prevail in studies dealing with more limited samples of countries generally hold when we look at a larger set of democracies. But we also show that the socioeconomic environment, which has been downplayed in previous studies, has a substantial impact on turnout.     

Developments in Danish Parliamentary Democracy: Accountability, Parties and External Constraints

Danish parliamentary developments since the Second World War include the consolidation of minority rule, a reduction in the power of established political parties, and more external constraints on parliamentary actors. They also involve a number of more specific changes to the various steps of delegation and accountability. The evidence tends to support the thesis of a paradox in the development of parliamentary democracy. On the one hand, changes in the constitutional chain of delegation and accountability have, on the whole, favoured the principals (voters, parliament, ministers) compared with their agents (parliament, ministers, civil servants). On the other hand, the established parties have declined somewhat and there are more external constraints than there used to be. This implies that the power of democratic principals has increased within narrower limits of action. In such a situation, the principals can be said to 'decide more about less' because of the stronger national and (not least) international constraints. However, the emergence of a partially new system of governance cannot unequivocally be called better or worse than the traditional Danish system of democratic governance.     

Bargaining Power, Political Transaction Costs and Institutional Change: Private and Public Dental Care in Denmark1

Rational choice institutionalism underexposes institutional change as well as the interaction between institutions at different levels, and this article therefore investigates national and local institutional change. In the Danish dental care sector private and public provision of services have coexisted since the establishment of a publicly financed dental health care system, and the fight between supporters of the two solutions has generated many institutional changes, both nationally and locally. This article analyses all Danish parliamentary proposals and local decisions regarding dental care coverage and provision. The general finding is that increasing pro-public bargaining power seems to promote higher coverage and public provision, while increasing pro-private bargaining power leads to stable coverage and private provision. The institutions do not, however, change whenever bargaining power changes, and national institutional change does not necessarily result in local change. The article explains this in terms of political transaction costs. These costs might also explain why national institutions change more often than local ones, and why local pro-public changes are faster and more frequent than local pro-private changes.     

Political Cycles,Fiscal Deficits,and Output Spillovers in Europe

This paper investigates whether national elections in Europegenerate political cycles in other European countries, and, ifso, whether these spillover effects are likely to surviveinside EMU. The paper first tests whether elections in Germanyaffect macroeconomic outcomes in other European countries andthen investigates the impact of elections on budget deficits.The results indicate that German politics significantlyimpacts macroeconomic variables in other European countries,and also that politics significantly affects the behaviour ofEuropean budgetary policy. The prospect of elections tends toincrease public deficits in recessions, whereas left-winggovernments tend to be more deficit-prone than right-winggovernments regardless of the state of the economy. Moreover,the existence of political cycles spillovers among Europeancountries suggest that there may be a need for electoralcoordination.